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Abstract 
In reexamining the hard problem of consciousness through the history of the 
concept of mind, I argue that psychologists, cognitive scientists, and analytic 
philosophers of mind should return to the first-person perspective or “what it is like”, to 
uncover its existential-phenomenological structure. Classical phenomenology which 
describes the structure of first-personal consciousness provides insight into the intrinsic 
quality of conscious experience. However, this insight into experience as a phenomenon 
for the subject is problematic for psychological explanation. Phenomenal “qualia” are 
seen as extra-mental entities not necessary for explaining the nature of consciousness. 
There appears to be nothing left to explain about consciousness after considering 
evolutionary and computational paradigms in psychology. On this view, mind is 
thoroughly and completely a system of complex causal mechanisms. 
In response, I examine criticism of Husserl’s phenomenology that resulted from 
increasing skepticism of introspective methods throughout the history of psychology. 
Namely, that phenomenological analysis must equate to a Cartesian, solipsistic, and 
ultimately limited analysis. Heidegger’s existential-phenomenological interpretation of 
consciousness addresses concerns about introspective methods. I show that Heidegger’s 
examination of the self-representing nature of consciousness serves to destructure the 
mechanistic attitude we have developed toward mind. In doing so, one may provide an 
answer to the hard problem – “what it is like” to be a conscious human being - eluded by 
mechanistic explanations. While Heidegger’s account is only one possible interpretation 
of the human experience, the mechanistic understanding can then also be seen as only 
one interpretation among many of what properly explains human conscious experience.   
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
The contemporary form of the mind-body problem is the hard problem of 
consciousness. It states that even after we have given a fully mechanistic explanation of 
mind in terms of psychological function there is still the further question: why is there 
“something it is like” to experience these mental states? David Chalmers has called 
attention to the intrinsic quality of conscious experience in asking what constitutes 
consciousness apart from its mechanistic explanation (Chalmers, 1996). Chalmers’ effort 
to preserve first-personal phenomenal consciousness should be reexamined through the 
methods of classical phenomenology. I aim to provide an answer to the hard problem, 
which calls for a qualitative investigation of consciousness. 
I argue that psychologists, cognitive scientists, and analytic philosophers of mind 
should reexamine the first-personal experience or “what it is like”, to uncover its 
existential-phenomenological structure. In particular, classical phenomenology as a 
philosophical discipline, which describes the structure of first-personal consciousness, 
provides insight into the intrinsic quality of experience. I account for criticism of 
phenomenology that resulted from developments in psychology and how Heidegger’s 
existential interpretation of consciousness addresses concerns about introspective 
phenomenology.  
To start, in chapter 2, I outline the conceptual history of consciousness, from the 
mind-body problem to the development of scientific psychology. Movement toward 
scientific methods in psychology, and away from philosophical introspection, distanced 
philosophically insightful perspectives on mind and consciousness from the same claim 
of legitimacy attributed to behavioural and functional paradigms. The relationship 
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between conscious mind and bodily function seems far less perplexing with current 
psychological knowledge on brain and behavior. As such, proposed solutions, and in 
some cases, the hard problem itself, appear trivial in comparison to mechanistic 
explanations of mind and consciousness.  
In chapter 3, I describe the hard problem of consciousness and how current 
mechanistic descriptions in psychology claim to explain qualitative experience. While 
qualitative experience can be explained through social evolutionary origins, and 
analogized with computational systems, the qualitative experience itself is still left for 
explication – why is there something it is like to have these mental states distinct from a 
causal description of their physical mechanisms? 
I look to answer this question in chapter 4, through the methods of 
phenomenology. Heidegger’s existential form of phenomenological analysis is an 
important development of the Husserlian study of consciousness. We are brought back to 
a description of things as they are experienced in the world, without a presupposed 
psychological understanding of experience. I examine psychological criticism of 
Husserl’s phenomenology in terms of introspective validity and the social evolutionary 
origins of meaning for experience. I then explicate Heidegger’s insight into qualitative 
experience through the significance of time and self-interpretation. Heidegger addresses 
these issues in positing a temporal structure of the human being, which fundamentally 
relates itself to the meanings of a particular historical upbringing. As such, I provide a 
phenomenological account of consciousness as a self-interpretive temporal process.  
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Chapter 2: Mind and Body from Philosophy to Psychology 
With our current state of psychology it seems that we should simply say there is 
no problem at all. Just as the world can be understood through physics, what can possibly 
be known about mind is said to be known through brain and behavior.  It was 
psychology’s job to justify knowledge about mind and consciousness in a thoroughgoing 
scientific framework. The mind-body problem is no problem for the modern functionalist 
or reductionist. However, we will eventually see why qualitative experience is not fully 
described by functional and reductive explanations.    
In this chapter, I will outline a number of positions on what mind is and how it 
can be explained. This will extend from Descartes and Kant on the mind-body problem, 
to the development of evolutionary and computational approaches on brain and 
behaviour. The major narrative behind this history of mind is how developments in 
scientific psychology divided introspective phenomenology from legitimate claim to 
knowledge about mind. Despite classical phenomenology being characterized by its 
investigation of consciousness, Darwin’s theory of evolution would form the major basis 
for understanding mind as an entity.  
 
Ontological positions on mind and body 
Like many mysterious entities that were eventually explained, what we call the 
mind is simply its mechanistic description. Consider lightning as an analogous natural 
phenomenon that was eventually explained in the language of science. Early humans may 
have looked in wonder at the occurrence of a sudden flash then fading from the sky, but 
lightning is now known to be the result of electric discharge. This functional explanation 
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of lightning can be reduced to an understanding of the separation and buildup of current 
in clouds. Separation, buildup, and discharge can then be reduced to an atomic 
description of these functions as well. Lightning as an event in nature can be explained 
with knowledge of its causal mechanisms. 
Mind and consciousness can be described in the same way - as a system of 
complex causal occurrences. The idea that mental life could be reduced to the level of 
mechanistic explanation is called reductive materialism or mind-brain identity theory 
(Kim, 1999). It states that causal relations among mental states can be suitably described 
and translated into physical explanations, ultimately reducible to the neural firing of the 
brain. Any kind of mental state, like happiness, pain, belief, or desire, can be suitably 
explained by a corresponding physical state in the brain. For example, we might simply 
say that the mental state of pain is equivalent to the physical event of C-fibres firing. 
Indeed, neural firing representing these mental states can be simulated through 
computational manipulations of mental representations (Thagard & Stewart, 2014).  
On the other hand, functionalism is the doctrine that mind and matter represent 
functional relations between the organism and its environmental inputs and outputs 
(Putnam, 1988; 2014). This mechanistic description of mental states is represented 
through a perceive-think-act cycle. For example, what we call pain, is not necessarily C-
fibres firing in the brain, but rather the function that mental state performs in the 
organism’s environmental context. This might involve the perception of sensations that 
cause the mental state of pain, and the resulting action to move away. Mental states are 
conceptualized as sensory inputs and behavioural outputs where cognition is a functional 
relation to the environment.  
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The advantage of functionalism over reductive materialism is that it does not 
claim one-to-one correspondence between mental states and causal events. Rather, there 
may be multiple realizations of particular mental states in different causal events (and 
vice-versa). This possibility, where different patterns of causal events involving brain and 
behavior may occur to instantiate the same type of mental state is called multiple 
realizability (Putnam, 1988). This means that pain in general may be instantiated by 
events other than C-fibres firing, and C-fibres firing may signify more than one kind of 
mental state like pain. Different realizations of the mental state of pain are due to 
interactions between sensory inputs and environmental context. The possibility of a 
number of different kinds of sensory interactions corresponds to a plurality of firing 
patterns in the brain, and resultantly different behavioural responses.  
Finally, there are the eliminative materialists. Like the reductive materialists, the 
Eliminativists think that the mind just is the brain. However, unlike the functionalists and 
reductive materialists, they do not accept the possibility of translating mental states into 
causal events. Instead, they wish to eliminate folk conceptions of mental states like belief, 
desire, intention, etc. and strictly replace them with causal events. They posit a 
completely new language of mental life based on neuroscientific terminology 
(Churchland, 1981). Not only is the mind a compound of causal mechanisms, but these 
mechanisms determine the language we use to refer to the mind and its mental 
phenomena. While an extreme position to take, a deferral of meaning to mechanism in 
describing consciousness has seemingly already taken effect. 
Before these positions existed, the relationship between mind and body can be 
traced to Plato, who posited that the world was represented through immaterial Forms 
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(Plato, trans. 1997). According to this view, the material world we apprehended with the 
senses was conceptualized through another plane of reality, the Forms or Ideas. Any 
physical particular of a universal concept like “tree”, “dog”, or “human being” is 
categorized by the subject through a representation taken from the realm of Ideas (Plato, 
trans. 1997, 100e). The imperfect objects of the material world are said to “participate” in 
the universal and perfect nature of the Forms. Grasping their nature required an 
immaterial mind (de anima, or soul) that could free itself from the physical body in 
thought (Plato, trans. 1997, 65b-67b). Through apprehension, the mind represented 
reality by calling upon the changeless, eternal ideas that allow us to cognize a changing, 
ephemeral material world (Plato, trans. 1997). Material body and immaterial mind related 
to the world through the Forms.  
Descartes drew a critical mind-body distinction in the Meditations through his 
skeptical method (Descartes, 1641/1986).1 In discerning that which he could not doubt 
with clear and distinct certainty, Descartes found that the external world did not hold up 
to his scrutiny (Descartes, 1641/1986). What was extended in space and time, like the 
bodies or physical objects surrounding him, could actually be hallucinations caused by an 
evil demon or worse yet, God himself (Descartes, 1641/1986). But what could not be 
doubted to exist was the thing that was being deceived, the thinker who thought these 
thoughts. While the perception of an extended hand or foot could be doubted, a mere 
illusion, the mind that perceives deceptive objects would remain. Descartes claimed the 
existence of two defining ontological substances: the extended material body and the 																																																								
1 “Critical” in terms of method, but also philosophical history. The scholastics before him 
did not take a non-dogmatic approach to knowledge. Descartes attempted to lay down a 
new foundation by first questioning whether claims to knowledge were valid in the first 
place. 
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immaterial soul that God made and loved. The worry of reality as deceptive illusion 
could be consoled in the idea of an all knowing and loving God who guaranteed the 
validity of clear and distinct ideas (Descartes, 1641/1986).   
In Kant, we find an inheritance of the same problem that befell Plato and 
Descartes: what was the relation between the subject who consciously perceives and the 
perceived material objects? Kant’s transcendental philosophy is analogous to the Forms, 
which are, in a Kantian sense, a condition for the possibility of conceptualizing the world 
(Kant, 1781/2007). Without apprehending the Forms, one cannot conceptualize reality. 
Kant’s transcendental doctrine is carried out in a similar fashion, as an investigation of 
the conditions for the possibility of having an experience.  
In Kant as in Descartes, we also find the irreducible unity of consciousness, the 
cogito, “I think”, or as Kant dubs it, the transcendental unity of apperception (Kant, 
1781/2007, A119). In the paralogisms, Kant asserts that this “I think” represents what we 
might call a soul (Kant, 1781/2007, A344/B402). Though as “paralogism” suggests, we 
cannot prove that this thing we call a soul actually exists. It is a bare representation, or 
appearance, like the external world (Kant, 1781/2007, A381-A382). 
For Kant, our experience of the external world is constructed by the mind as an 
appearance (1781/2007, A19). We can be sure that there are objects in the world, for we 
encounter resistance when they are touched or manipulated. But the independent nature 
of these objects, apart from the subject, characterizes things-in-themselves, or the object 
behind the appearances.  
The object behind appearances was called the Noumenon, while the world as 
presented through appearances, Phenomena (Kant, 1781/2007, A249). The world of 
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appearances is constructed by the mind through basic forms of intuition like causality, 
space, and time (Kant, 1781/2007). In a debt to David Hume, Kant explains that we are 
only ever exposed to the constant conjunction of objects affecting one another by the 
dictates of space and time (Kant, 1781/2007, A107). Space and time are not actually 
things “out there” but intuitions supplied by the mind to construct sensible objects; they 
are conditions for the possibility of having an experience. These “forms of intuition” are 
the limiting conditions for our knowledge of the world, which is synthesized into a whole 
by a presupposed unity of consciousness (Kant, 1781/2007, A107). According to Kant, 
without this unity, appearances would be a disorganized manifold of sensations. Kant 
acknowledged that how the mind furnishes reality in order to make sense of it leaves us 
open to the skeptical question: what are objects when there is no mind to provide the 
conditions for their possibility?  
The third reality needed to rejoin mind and material body was no longer the 
Forms, but the thing-in-itself; the subject-independent essence of the object before it is 
cognized. But rather than coming to know the Forms, Kant held that we could never 
know the thing-in-itself (Kant, 1781/2007). This included the synthetic unity that can 
think of appearances as thing-in-itself. The mind cannot be considered as a real Cartesian 
substance, but rather a representation of the barest kind; the “I think” is a condition 
needed for the conscious unity of experience (Kant, 1781/2007).  
Through Kant and Descartes’ examination of the relationship between mind, 
body, and the world, we can come to understand the theoretical basis these positions find 
in the contemporary mind-body debate. In terms of preliminary labels, Descartes’ view is 
called substance dualism, in that he posits a fundamental ontological substance of the 
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mind, separate from the physical. On the other hand, Kant’s distinction that mind confers 
conditions on experience through the possibility of existing as such, is called idealism. 
Kant’s brand of idealism can be regarded as a rather modest kind in comparison to 
Plato’s metaphysics, or the subjective idealism encapsulated in Berkeley’s, esse est 
percipi. But both Berkeley and Kant assert that what we might call physical reality is 
actually a construction of the mind: for Berkeley, in God’s mind; for Kant, in each human 
consciousness. 
 
Origins of scientific psychology 
Darwin had a profound impact on how we understand the mind. The privileged 
position of human consciousness was rebuked with the discovery of our common 
evolutionary descent from the animal kingdom. We developed through the same dictates 
of survival, reproduction, and fitness over millions of years. Basic sensory input and 
behavioural output could be used to systematically understand human thought and the 
production of behaviour.   
Following Darwin, the mind was increasingly more defined by implicit 
mechanisms. Consciousness is constantly the victim of evolutionarily programmed 
processes, occurring far below our introspective awareness. Freud especially knew this: 
“But the third and most irritating insult is flung at the human mania of greatness by 
present-day psychological research, which wants to prove to the "I" that it is not even 
master in its own home, but is dependent upon the most scanty information concerning 
all that goes on unconsciously in its psychic life.” (Freud, 1920, pg. 247). If the mind was 
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consciousness, then consciousness was really a manifestation of hidden desires in 
thought, action, and association.  
Modern psychological research points directly at this hidden machinery and says, 
“this is all we are”. The revelation is that mind is nothing but causal mechanisms. 
Through the methods of psychology and neuroscience, it is finally revealed, “You, your 
joys and your sorrows…are nothing but a pack of neurons” (Tononi, 2012, pg. 23). What 
explains consciousness, and what we more generally call the mind, are scientifically 
precise causal relationships.  
Mental philosophy begins with mind over matter, firstly in Cartesian substance 
dualism, and then Kant’s transcendental idealism. Alongside these views, there were 
obvious examples of early modern materialists like John Locke, Francis Bacon, and John 
Stuart Mill. Bacon most notably wanted all of nature reduced to empirical science 
(Cornforth, 1955). Yet it was 300 years later this paradigm would translate to the nature 
of mind. While still a young discipline in this regard, scientific psychology’s historical 
fork from mental philosophy distanced our understanding of the mind from dualism and 
idealism.2  
It is commonplace in the history of psychology to note when the first 
psychological lab opened - 1879 at the University of Leipzig by Wilhelm Wundt. Many 
say it was because Wundt finally joined the questions of philosophy with the methods of 
physiology that he should be regarded as the founder of psychology (Benjamin, 2007; 
																																																								
2 This is not to discount the many instances one could further cite as precipitating the 
eventual rise of scientific psychology. For example, W.V.O. Quine’s “Epistemology 
Naturalized” offers the same solution to a grounding of knowledge about reality. Gilbert 
Ryle’s “Concept of Mind” is famously regarded as the “final nail” in the Cartesian coffin. 
If Ryle was a nail, early psychologists were the planks.  
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Goodwin, 2010). But the science of mind started before Wundt with the psychophysics of 
Gustav Fechner. His insights were thoroughly motivated by the mind-body problem, as 
he notes the day of October 22, 1850 when he made a crucial discovery: it was possible 
to measure the relationship between physical and psychological worlds (Benjamin, 2007). 
Psychophysics was based on the principle that one could measure the relationship 
between stimuli in the external world (physical events) and the person’s perception of 
those stimuli (psychological events) (Fechner, 1860/1966). Before rejecting the existence 
of a mental realm, the science of mind first took dualism as a methodological starting 
point. His book, Elements of Psychophysics (1860) became well regarded by almost all 
early German psychologists, including Wundt.   
Wundt’s introspective methodology was based on presenting highly trained 
observers (usually graduate students) with stimuli and asking them to report their 
experiences (Galotti, Fernandes, Fugelsang, & Stolz, 2010). Through the presentation of 
physical phenomena, Wundt attempted to measure their relationship to the mental, in the 
psychophysical spirit of Fechner.  
His psychology aimed to establish a science of mind to discover the laws and 
principles explaining our immediate conscious experience. He posited that any conscious 
thought or perception resulted from a combination of sensations that could be categorized 
in terms of mode, quality, intensity, and duration. The raw materials of consciousness 
were assumed to be sensory and thus “below” the level of meaning in sensory experience 
(Galotti et al, 2010). 
Wundt’s best student, Edward Titchener, had christened their methods 
“structuralism”, which sought to uncover the elements of mind through the introspective 
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analysis of consciousness: “We shall therefore take mind and consciousness to mean the 
same thing. But as we have the two different words, and it is convenient to make some 
distinction between them, we shall speak of mind when we mean the sum-total of mental 
processes occurring in the life-time of an individual, and we shall speak of consciousness 
when we mean the sum-total of mental processes occurring now, at any given ‘present’ 
time. Consciousness will thus be a section, a division, of the mind-stream…” (Titchener, 
1909, pg. 18-19). By the time of Titchener’s death in 1927, he had amassed a “periodic 
table” of the mind, consisting of over 30,000 elements including distinctness, quality, 
intensity, etc. (Goodwin, 2010).   
The success of experimental introspection would be short-lived. Laboratory 
studies would continue, but structuralism was viewed as rather closed-minded in its 
reliance on introspection. Not only did Darwin’s work set the stage for the first iteration 
of functionalist perspectives, introspective techniques appeared to lack a non-circular 
justification. 
 Titchener attempted to establish a proper introspective method by standardizing 
the process. He instructed his research participants before conducting his studies, 
dismissing those who could not introspect “properly”. Yet there was no way to confirm 
that his was the correct way of introspecting (Galotti et al, 2010). 
Wundt and Titchener’s structuralism in Germany is often contrasted to William 
James’s functionalism in America (Galotti et al, 2010). Like Wundt, James was also 
heavily interested in conscious experience and the development of a scientific study of 
mind. But unlike Wundt, a prolific researcher who carried out and supervised hundreds of 
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experiments, James carried out little research but wrote on psychological findings and 
their relevance to everyday life (Galotti et al, 2010).  
Understanding the evolutionary utility of consciousness motivated the 
functionalist program: What was consciousness for? Rather than asking what the 
elementary units of consciousness are, functionalists ask why the mind works the way it 
does. At this time, functionalism heavily overlapped with the views of pragmatists 
William James and John Dewey.  
James remarked on the influence Darwin would have on the study of mind: “The 
theory of evolution is beginning to do very good service by its reduction of all mentality 
to [a] type of reflex action. Cognition, in this view, is but a fleeting moment, a cross-
section at a certain point, of what in its totality is a motor phenomenon. In the lower 
forms of life no one will pretend that cognition is anything more than a guide to 
appropriate action.” (James, 1897, pg. 18). John Dewey’s concept of the reflex arc 
(sensing, thinking, acting) marks the starting point of the functional view in psychology 
(Benjamin, 2007).  
Contra Titchener’s dependence on introspection, the functionalists opposed the 
structuralists. In 1906, a student of James and Dewey, James Rowland Angell, would 
become the president of the American Psychological Association. Angell was considered 
the chief spokesperson for functionalism, even using his presidential address to attack 
structuralism and outline the merits of his view (Benjamin, 2007). This was reflected in 
Angell’s tenets of functionalism: a) functionalism studies mental operations not mental 
elements, b) it seeks to identify the fundamental utilities of consciousness, and c) 
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functionalism is a psychophysical psychology (Benjamin, 2007). For Angell, mind and 
body are joined through functional goal-directed action. 
Investigating the use and function of consciousness would be seen in comparative 
psychology. For example, in Edward Thorndike’s puzzle-box experiments with cats, and 
Ivan Pavlov’s conditioning experiments with dogs (Benjamin, 2007; Hatfield, 2002). 
Each used stimulus-response relationships to investigate learning, memory, and 
association versus introspective awareness in sensation and perception. These studies 
would add credence to the evolutionary perspective on animals, humans, and their 
explanatory origins. Early Darwinian functionalism would cast doubt on introspective 
justification for knowledge about the structures of mind and consciousness.  
In the 1920’s-30’s, while Freud called popular attention to unconscious 
mechanisms, both German and American psychologists had two respectively well-
established, yet conflicting views: gestaltism, and an heir of functionalist tenets, 
behaviourism (Benjamin, 2007). For these psychologists, Freud’s unfalsifiable, 
introspectively justified theories were regarded in similar terms as the pop-psychology of 
phrenology, spiritualism, and mesmerism that came before them (Benjamin, 2007).  
Indeed, mind as mechanism was reflected through the historical influence of 
functionalism: its shadow over structuralism and it’s branching into behaviourism. The 
behaviourists were more extreme in their reduction of mind to behaviour than the early 
functionalists. As a doctrine, behaviourism is broadly divided into two different parts: 1) 
Methodological and 2) Analytical.  
Methodological behaviourism states that psychology is the science of behavior, 
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an effort to finally make psychology worthy of being called a natural science. In 1913, 
the founder of behaviourism, John Watson, lectured at Colombia University on what 
would be called the Behaviourist Manifesto: “I do not wish unduly to criticize 
psychology. It has failed signally, I believe, during its fifty-odd years of existence as an 
experimental discipline to make its place in the world as an undisputed natural science” 
(1913/1994, pg. 249). He went on, “The time seems to have come when psychology must 
discard all reference to consciousness; when it need no longer delude itself into thinking 
that it is making mental states the object of observation” (Watson, 1913/1994, pg. 249).  
Watson’s methodological behaviourism can be seen as analogous to eliminative 
materialism. Just as the eliminativists want to rid psychology of mental terminology, so 
did the methodological behaviourists. For example, Clark Hull wanted to exclude all 
mentalistic descriptions and explanations from the study of behavior (Hatfield, 2002). 
Like Watson, he also thought that the best explanations in psychology would come in 
neurophysiological terms (Hatfield, 2002; Benjamin, 2007). Behaviourists do not 
translate mental states into behaviour, they eliminate and replace with terminology 
describing brain and behaviour. 
On the other hand, analytical behaviourists like Edward Tolman resemble 
reductive materialism. Analytical behaviourism states that in theory development, if 
mental terms are used, they can and should be translated into behavioural terms, rather 
than omitted. Tolman thought that mentalistic terms could be used as long as they were 
translated as intervening variables for behaviour (Hatfield, 2002). He posited intervening 
psychological representations to explain response tendencies in behaviour. Just as the 
analytical behaviourists translate mental states into behavioural response tendencies, 
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reductive materialists translate mental states into neural mechanisms. They do not 
eliminate - they translate. 
The other well-known behaviourist, B.F. Skinner, differed from both Hull and 
Tolman. He rejected mental terms that could not be translated into neutral behavioural 
explanations (Hatfield, 2002). However, unlike Hull and Tolman, Skinner did not think 
behavioural descriptions of mental phenomena could be translated with neurophysiology. 
Skinner thought that only some mental phenomena could be translated, the rest 
eliminated (Hatfield, 2002). 
Two important philosophical views sprouted from the evolution of functionalism 
into behaviourism: those of Gilbert Ryle and Ludwig Wittgenstein. Ryle thought that 
reference to mental terms was a “category mistake” in that mental states were referring to 
dispositions for behavior, not discrete states (Ryle, 1949). Wittgenstein’s private 
language argument stated that a language private to the subject is inconceivable (1953, 
para. 243-261). This includes a language describing one’s private conscious experience. 
Reference to private mental life only makes sense in its relation to social behavior, as all 
meaning comes from its use in a public language game (Wittgenstein, 1953, para. 241, 
para. 300).  
Developments in psychology made introspective reference to mental states 
obsolete, and with it, reference to “what it is like”. According to David Chalmers, the key 
change at this point in history is that in transitioning from an emphasis on the study of 
introspective sensation and perception to learning and behavior, psychology’s reference 
to mental states was only ever construed in relation to behaviour (Chalmers, 1996, 
pg.12). Talk about psychology as phenomenology transitioned to psychology as talk 
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about dispositions to behavior. The conclusions that behaviourists, functionalists, and 
even neo-Freudians had in mind were thoroughly based on mechanistic cause and effect, 
independent of phenomenal concepts.  
The mistrust of early Darwinian functionalists toward introspective methods 
would be reflected in the behaviourists and their feud with gestaltism. In still relying on a 
form of introspection, gestaltism was viewed by the behaviorists in the same light as 
structuralism. However, gestalt psychologists were also opposed to Titchener’s 
structuralism (Benjamin, 2007; Goodwin, 2010). Gestaltism claimed that the “whole was 
greater than its parts” meaning that what was conceptualized from the first-person 
perspective was more important to understanding the mind, than reductive analysis into 
structural parts. This included reduction to behaviour (Benjamin, 2007).  
Gestaltism was thoroughly phenomenological in its reliance on the way things 
appeared to the subject (Benjamin, 2007). It claimed to account for the way subjects 
impart meaning in perception by recognizing qualities in the whole of experience that 
cannot be studied in its parts. One such example was the “phi” phenomenon where an 
object would be seen as moving continuously in space and time when really it was only 
the appearing and disappearing of the image one was seeing (Benjamin, 2007). They 
argued that experience itself was the only thing worth knowing, and that it could be 
studied exactly as it occurred (Kohler, 1929). As such, gestalt psychology studied 
experience in its meaningful units from the first-person perspective.  
But non-phenomenal psychology continued to develop with the turn from 
behaviourism to cognitive psychology. The response to behaviourism by these later 
functionalists was still only a translation of mental states as causal dispositions to 
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behavior: “The move from behaviourism to computational cognitive science for the most 
part preserved this orthodoxy. This move brought back a role for internal states, which 
could even be called “mental” states, but there was nothing particularly phenomenal 
about them. These states were admissible precisely on the grounds of their relevance in 
the explanation of behavior…It was meant as an analysis of all mental concepts. In 
particular, they argued that the notions of experience, sensation, consciousness, and so 
on, could be analyzed in this fashion.” (Chalmers, 1996, pg. 12).  
In the 1950s, after psychologists took seriously the notion of mental 
representations, functionalism gained new ground in the computational analogy. Indeed, 
the notion that there was anything other than mind as machine was summarized by Alan 
Turing: “In considering the functions of the mind or the brain we find certain operations 
which we can explain in purely mechanical terms. This we say does not correspond to the 
real mind: it is a sort of skin that we must strip off to find the real mind. But then in what 
remains we find a further skin to be stripped off, and so on. Proceeding in this way, do 
we ever come to the real mind, or do we eventually come to the skin which has nothing in 
it? In the latter case, the whole mind is mechanical” (Turing, 1950, pg. 454-455).  
In his paper, “Computing Machinery and Intelligence”, Turing introduced the 
computational analogy, proposing we should avoid a kind of anthropocentrism in our use 
of the term “think” (1950). Presumably, “think” most directly refers to our human 
activity, where it might occasionally be attributed to other living beings. But can 
machines think? Turing was interested in teasing apart this difference in use because 
perhaps there was no difference at all. Especially in considering how the computer can 
perform many of the same tasks as a human being.   
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Today’s contemporary form of functionalism resembles analytical behaviourism 
and reductive materialism. After early Darwinian functionalism, and the rise of 
behaviourism, developments in computing made it possible to investigate the inner 
workings of the mind by understanding it analogously to a computational-
representational system (Galotti et al, 2010). In examining mental representations as 
computational mechanisms, functionalism accounts for the mind and body. 
 
Husserl’s phenomenology 
What happened to the phenomenal concept of mind? The study of 
phenomenology would continue with Edmund Husserl, who along with Wundt, Freud, 
and gestalt psychologists, traced their intellectual roots to a common mentor, Franz 
Brentano. Brentano was concerned with the intentionality or inherent “aboutness” of 
consciousness. Object directionality or the way things were represented as a whole in 
consciousness originates with Brentano’s Act Theory of Consciousness (Benjamin, 
2007). Brentano’s concept of intentionality was considered the mark of the mental, 
pointing toward the inherent representational ability of human consciousness (Brentano, 
1874/2009). This early version of psychology called for a larger unit of analysis, the 
eventual underlying principle of gestaltism. For example, in the study of vision, Brentano 
argued that one should focus on the act of seeing itself, rather than what was seen 
(Benjamin, 2007).  
But while Freud, Wundt, and gestalt psychologists actively tried to join 
introspective methods to psychology, Edmund Husserl would follow more directly from 
Descartes and Kant. Husserl took advantage of Kant’s transcendental distinction such that 
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objects were regarded not as things in themselves, but as appearances presented to, or 
intended by, consciousness. All consciousness is a consciousness of something, where I 
am aware that my thought is directed toward some object. In this analysis of the structure 
of experience, Husserl is paying particular attention to experience that can be 
characterized as being “conscious of something”. Each act of consciousness possesses a 
Brentanian “object-directedness” or intentionality.  
Husserl resembled Kant as his mode of inquiry was not of this or that form of 
knowledge, but of the possibility of knowledge in the first place. We must first “bracket” 
anything beyond our immediate conscious experience. If we can only be sure about 
appearances as a phenomenon, then we should bracket whether there is anything other 
than the phenomenon and investigate it as it appears. We should inspect the passing 
conscious appearances presented to us. The task of phenomenology was to elucidate the 
core questions concerning the nature of reality, including the relation between body and 
mind, by attempting to start with a presuppositionless methodology (Zahavi, 2003).  
Most importantly, phenomenology’s basic tool suspends the natural attitude we 
have in our everyday encounter of the world by bracketing its presupposed validity. In 
doing so, we attempt to understand reality as we encounter it, without any 
presuppositions about what we are encountering. To describe what Husserl means by the 
everyday attitude, I turn to an explication by phenomenologist, Richard Holmes: 
I find myself in this particular world surrounded by objects, animate and 
inanimate, all of which I take to be real existents among others. In all my dealings 
with this world I live in the natural attitude, that is, I accept unquestioningly the 
world and its objects as existing. To be sure, this acceptance is rarely, if ever, 
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explicitly formulated or considered, but it is a general presupposition that supports 
my dealings with the world and is the target of the phenomenological reduction 
(1995). 
The phenomenological reduction initiates a study of consciousness that 
presupposes no metaphysical stance on the nature of experience as such. It does not 
explain this or that consciousness as the product of brain function, evolution, unconscious 
mechanism, or soul-substance. Rather, it examines the act of consciousness, as intended. 
By initiating this study of conscious appearances, the natural attitude is “suspended” or 
“bracketed” in such a way that it is “set out of action” (Holmes, 1995).   
“Recall the piece of wax Descartes describes in Meditation II: Fresh from the hive 
it still has the sweetness of the honey it contains, and the odour of the flowers” (Holmes, 
1995, pg. 6). As Descartes goes on, he describes a number of qualities of the wax: its 
colour, figure, and size are apparent, where the wax is hard, cold, easily handled, and 
when struck with the finger, it emits a sound. If taken to a fire, “what remains of its taste 
is exhaled, the smell evaporates, the colour alters, the figure is destroyed, the size 
increases, it becomes liquid” (Holmes, 1995, pg. 6). Descartes asks, “Does the same wax 
remain after this change?” (Holmes, 1995, pg. 6). 
Holmes remarks that Descartes’ concern with the piece of wax comes from an 
apparent dualism between what appears and what is: “Or, to put this dualism in terms of a 
problem…I have access only to what appears, and that like an onion when I peel off all 
the experienced or experience-able layers of an object I am left with nothing” (1995, pg. 
6). Juxtaposed to Turing’s analogy, which serves to imply that mind is nothing but 
mechanism, mind is rather consciously accessible layers of experience.   
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By analyzing conscious experience as it occurs, appearances are not just 
representations, but integral parts of consciousness as a whole. The nature of 
consciousness is revealed in as much as we pay close attention to how appearances 
manifest themselves to us (Zahavi, 2003). No longer is the reality of conscious 
experience hidden behind the appearances, rather, it emerges through its unfolding as a 
phenomenon (Zahavi, 2003).  
 
Psychology versus phenomenology 
Gestaltism and structuralism would carry their experimental work to cognitive 
psychology in the study of perception, sensation, and memory (Galotti et al, 2010; 
Goodwin, 2010). On the other hand, explicit mention of the phenomenology of 
consciousness, or the first-person perspective, would be associated with awareness of 
intrinsic qualities of experience, or qualia. The concept of experiential qualia is treated by 
cognitive science as a functional disposition to behavior (Block, 2002/2007b), or an 
empirically reducible representation (Harman, 1990). The synthesis of functional-
representational perspectives can be seen through the computational analogy of brain and 
behavior.  
Functionalism sits firmly as a bridge between the study of behavior and the study 
of mental processes. By conceptualizing mental processing like a computer, operating 
through basic inputs, symbolic manipulation, and behavioural outputs, we can understand 
the organism in its natural environment, including its evolutionary origins. Behavior and 
mental life are produced by the physiological underpinnings of brain, body, and context.  
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Chalmers’ distinction between the phenomenal and the psychological forms an 
important basis here, situating the current debate on mind and body within the history of 
psychology and philosophy. Much of the history of mind marks movement toward 
psychological forms of explanation, while the phenomenal is relegated to philosophical 
speculation in its reliance on introspection. On the psychological concept of mind, 
conscious experience is characterized by what it does – what is its function? On the 
phenomenal concept of mind, conscious experience is characterized by the way it feels.  
Explaining, “what it is like”, the raw feeling, or the first-personal qualities of 
experience is difficult. Chalmers refers to qualia as the distinctive first-person 
phenomenon that a person experiences. This can include conscious states like pain or 
emotion but also the very fact that there is something like consciousness that provides 
one with emotions, mental states, and experience in general.  
Ned Block acknowledges that the concept of “phenomenal consciousness” cannot 
be defined in a noncircular way: “Phenomenal consciousness is experience; what makes a 
state phenomenally conscious is that there is something ‘it is like’, that is, an experience 
of that conscious state. However, this is not considered an embarrassment, as a history of 
reductive definitions in philosophy should not expect one to provide a reductive 
definition. The best one can do for phenomenal consciousness is simply point to the 
phenomenon. Nonetheless, it is important to point properly.” (Block, 2002/2007a, pg. 
275).  
Reference to first-personal mental states as a form of study by the subject in their 
own right is precisely the problem. The contrasting use of the onion analogy by Turing 
and Holmes reflects the difference in phenomenal versus psychological perspectives on 
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mind. For Turing, mind is composed of layers of functional mechanisms. For Holmes, 
mind encompasses layers of descriptive quality. Mind and body may be united through 
function, but there is still the experience of this unity to explain. The phenomenological 
perspective provides a structural analysis of consciousness conceived as a whole, greater 
than its mechanistic parts. 
Husserl’s phenomenology aimed to describe the character of this self-reflecting 
consciousness. But his methodology was lost to the development of post-Darwinian 
functionalism and behaviourism. The behaviorists’ denial of consciousness altogether 
would not last after the rise of computational theories of cognitive representation, but the 
dominant construal of mentality in reference to behaviour remained. For Husserl, the 
experience itself appears to us with a far more primordial understanding of the 
relationship between mind, body, and world – one more foundational and pre-theoretical 
than the use of these concepts. 
Heidegger would eventually take up this task in his own phenomenological 
investigation. But because of the same methodological differences with modern 
psychology, his inquiry would be separated from the new debate in philosophy of mind. 
Instead, experiential consciousness or the “what-it-is-like” of our experience would be 
discussed in the Hard Problem. Having discussed the historical divide between 
phenomenology and psychology, we can now discuss how this methodological divide 
arises in understanding the concept of consciousness.  
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Chapter 3: The Hard Problem of Consciousness 
The hard problem distinguishes phenomenal from psychological concepts of 
consciousness. I will move through a number of philosophical arguments used to 
demonstrate this distinction, and then describe how psychology attempts to explain the 
experiential quality of consciousness through function. The two approaches I discuss, the 
computational analogy and the evolutionary approach, explain the emergence of 
consciousness through simulations of neural mechanisms, and the social evolutionary 
development of distinctly human collective intentionality. However, they still do not fully 
describe the distinctive what-it-is-likeness of consciousness itself.  
The hard problem states that even if we could explain and correlate all the 
functional mechanisms about the mind, there would still be the further question: why is 
there something it is like to experience these mental states?  
Chalmers posited the Hard Problem of Consciousness in a paper, “Facing Up to 
the Problem of Consciousness” (1995), and in a book, “The Conscious Mind: In search 
for a fundamental theory” (1996). For Chalmers, accounting for mental events and their 
correlated brain states are “easy problems” while explaining why these brain states 
should ever give rise to experiential mental events, the “hard problem”. The hard problem 
is not solved by merely understanding the dynamics of functional and structural processes 
in the brain, but by accounting for why there should be anything it is like to carry out 
functions and processes as a subject (Chalmers, 1996). Chalmers states that a reductionist 
paradigm aiming to explain the emergence of consciousness through physical phenomena 
would be impossible: “Given any account of the physical processes purported to underlie 
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consciousness, there will always be a further question: why are these processes 
accompanied by conscious experience?” (Chalmers, 1996, pg. 94).  
Apart from the physical phenomena that underlie or appear to be causally 
efficacious in producing conscious experience, Chalmers argues for the existence of 
epiphenomenal qualia. Asserting the existence of epiphenomenal qualia differs from 
substance dualism in that no “supernatural” metaphysical substance is posited to explain 
what consciousness is. Rather, consciousness includes experiential properties of 
sensations, feelings, perceptions, thoughts, desires, etc. – there is something it is like to 
have these experiences. The core of Chalmers’ argument is that consciousness does not 
logically entail or “supervene” as a consequent to existent physical causal events. Two of 
Chalmers’ most notable arguments are the possibility of philosophical zombies and the 
knowledge argument (Chalmers, 1996).   
The first argument posits an entity whose functional make-up is identical to 
humans, but lacks conscious experience. While the empirical possibility of this sort of 
zombie is impossible, it is still coherent insofar as it lacks logical contradiction 
(Chalmers, 1996). Chalmers finds indirect support for its conceivability in the “China 
Brain” thought experiment posited by Ned Block:   
Suppose we convert the government of China to functionalism, and we convince 
its officials to realize a human mind for an hour. We provide each of the billion 
people in China with a specially designed two-way radio that connects them in the 
appropriate way to other persons and to [an] artificial body …The system of a 
billion people communicating with one another plus satellites plays the role of an 
external “brain” connected to the artificial body by radio (Block, 1978/2007).  
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Here we assume that China Brain would have the same functional organization as 
an embodied brain, and may even realize consciousness despite being composed of 
Chinese citizens (Chalmers, 1996).  However, Chalmers is not concerned with whether 
such a system would in fact be conscious, but that it is also conceivable that such a 
system would not be conscious, much like a zombie. From this there is no more a 
conceptual entailment from biochemistry to consciousness than there is from “silicon or 
Chinese homunculi” (Chalmers, 1996, pg. 86). If China Brain is conceivably not 
conscious, then a non-conscious zombie twin is also conceivable. In other words, a 
functionally equivalent entity like a computational robot. As such, consciousness does 
not logically entail from physical constituents. There are facts about consciousness that 
are not automatically entailed from mechanistic explanations. 
Chalmers shows this possibility for independent knowledge about consciousness 
from the first-person perspective by citing Thomas Nagel’s, “What is it like to be a bat?” 
(1974). Like humans, the mechanisms explaining bat consciousness do not entail 
phenomenological knowledge about what it is like to be a bat. Given that the physical 
facts about a bat are independent of the qualitative facts, Chalmers states that facts about 
experiential consciousness do not supersede from the physical facts about consciousness 
(1996). There are facts that exist separately from the physical mechanisms. As such, there 
is knowledge about phenomenal consciousness that exists independently of mechanistic 
knowledge about consciousness.  
The knowledge argument, originating with Frank Jackson, posits the existence of 
epiphenomenal qualia through the thought experiment, Mary the Neuroscientist (1982). 
Mary is a brilliant neuroscientist who, for whatever reason, is forced to live her whole life 
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in a black and white room, investigating the world through a black and white television 
monitor (Jackson, 1982). She specializes in the neurophysiology of vision and acquires 
all the physical knowledge there is to obtain about what happens when we see ripe 
tomatoes or the blue sky, what entails using the terms “red” or “blue”, etc. This involves 
exact wavelength calculations, knowing the mechanisms of retina stimulation, and even 
the vocal chord contractions and “expulsion of air” that result in uttering, “the sky is 
blue”. Once Mary is released from the room, into a fully coloured world, does she gain 
any new knowledge (Jackson, 1982)?  
Proponents of phenomenal knowledge would maintain that Mary does learn 
something new, namely what it is like, for example, to have the experience of the 
blueness of the sky or the redness of a tomato. Despite knowing all the physical facts 
about blueness or redness, Mary still learns something new. She learns a fact about what 
it is like to experience those physical facts. As such, all the physical facts do not entail 
phenomenal facts.  
The Hard Problem is put in a very concise form by Ned Block, who groups the 
major dispute about the nature of consciousness between two perspectives:  
1) Deflationism about consciousness, in which a priori or at least armchair 
analyses of consciousness (or at least armchair-sufficient conditions) are given 
in nonphenomenal terms, most prominently in terms of representation, 
thought, or function 
2) Phenomenal realism, which consists in the denial of deflationism plus the 
claim that consciousness, is something real. Phenomenal realism is 
metaphysical realism about consciousness and thus allows the possibility that 
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there may be facts about the distribution of consciousness that are not 
accessible to us even though the relevant functional, cognitive, and 
representational facts are accessible. Phenomenal realism is based one’s first-
person grasp of consciousness while allowing that first person cognition about 
one’s own conscious states can be incomplete and mistaken (Block, 2007b, 
pg. 398).  
The Hard Problem states that even if we provided a completely mechanistic 
explanation of consciousness as an emergent phenomenon, there would still be a further 
question – why is there something it is like to have these conscious states? Let’s take a 
look at how the functional paradigm attempts to explain qualitative experience. 
 
Two doctrines of consciousness 
One may combine empirical developments in scientific psychology to form more 
comprehensive functional theories of consciousness. Through cognitive science one aims 
to explain the same relational processes between mind and body that Kant, Descartes, and 
early psychologists encountered. Theoretical paradigms that emerged in the study of 
mind and body are used to establish a relation that ultimately depends on reality itself. 
Representing, thinking, and acting in the environment depend on the ability to perceive 
and conceptualize reality. The mind is intimately related to how we consciously 
experience the world through our body. Of course, the physical explanation of this 
relation does not posit soul-like substances or transcendental conditions on the physical. 
Rather, cognitive science aims to combine developments in a variety of scientific 
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disciplines like psychology, neuroscience, evolutionary anthropology, and artificial 
intelligence.  
 
A. The Computational Analogy 
This approach emerged out of the cognitive revolution and associated 
developments in computing. I will discuss a computational theory of consciousness, 
Semantic Pointer Competition (SPC) (Thagard & Stewart, 2014). SPC theory utilizes 
computation to mimic the mechanisms of brain function. As such, it may be seen as a 
hybrid theory of functionalism and reductive materialism. Brain function is considered 
part of a perceive-think-act cycle dependent on functional relations between sensory 
inputs, informational processing as computations performed on representations, and 
behavioural outputs. Ultimately, these structural representations and functional processes 
are reducible to neural mechanisms.  
 SPC theory is closely related to the Computational-Representational 
Understanding of Mind (CRUM). As stated in Mind: An Introduction to Cognitive 
Science: “Here is the central hypothesis of cognitive science: Thinking can best be 
understood in terms of representational structures in the mind and computational 
procedures that operate on those structures” (Thagard, 2005, pg. 10). Computational 
procedures refer to mathematically precise neural mechanisms that manipulate and 
transform different kinds of mental representations.  
 On SPC, consciousness results from three neural mechanisms: “representation by 
firing patterns in neural populations, binding of representations into more complex 
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representations called semantic pointers, and competition among semantic pointers to 
capture the most important aspects of an organism’s state” (Thagard & Stewart, 2014).  
All mental phenomena can be reduced to the compression, recursive binding, and 
convolution of symbol-like representations called Semantic Pointers. These are 
mathematical processes represented by a Neural-Engineering Framework (NEF) 
developed by Chris Eliasmith and Anderson (2003, as cited in Thagard & Stewart, 2014). 
These mathematical processes are used to simulate the firing, representation, binding, and 
competition of neural populations as semantic pointers. Qualitative experiences are a 
result of different neural representations that get bound into a Semantic Pointer (Thagard 
& Stewart, 2014). 
Semantic Pointers are special kinds of neural representations. They are the 
bindings of different patterns of neural firing that give rise to mental representations: 
“Roughly speaking, semantic pointers are neurally instantiated, symbol-like 
representations that can be transformed in numerous ways to yield further representations 
that function to support cognitive processes like categorization, inference, and language 
use” (Blouw, Solodkin, Thagard, Eliasmith, 2015, pg. 2). Mental representations are built 
from sensorimotor concepts that are bound together by a mathematical process called 
convolution. Finally, Semantic Pointers that outcompete others are those mental 
representations that are conscious to the subject.  
Mental representations are similar to the sensory images of the world that 
Descartes doubted, and the Kantian appearances that the mind constructed to represent 
reality. Indeed, they represent our everyday experience through the unity of 
consciousness. Whereas Descartes posited the soul, and Kant, the transcendental self, 
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CRUM states that the building blocks of mind, in ascending order of complexity, 
sensorimotor concepts, images, rules, and emotions combine to give rise to other 
complex mental representations like the idea of consciousness and the self (Thagard, 
2014). These representations can be thought of as neural mechanisms explained through 
computational analogies.   
Concepts are considered “the basic representational entities that comprise our 
knowledge of the world” (Blouw et al, 2015, pg. 2). Semantic Pointers explain how 
concepts can be formed through the binding of neural populations. Concepts like “Dog”, 
“Tree”, or “Black” can be thought of as groups of Semantic Pointers mostly composed of 
compressed sensorimotor information, but also verbal and emotional representations. 
Neural populations that fire to represent these concepts are capable of being bound 
together to form more complex representations (Blouw et al, 2015). 
Circular convolution binds concepts together through patterns of neural firing that 
transform these concepts into a new representation (Thagard & Stewart, 2014). When we 
combine concepts, we get more complex mental representations from different neural 
populations engaged together in convolution. For example, sensory representations of 
touch, taste, smell, sight, and hearing may be combined with emotional representations of 
love, fear, desire, or even verbal representations describing them.  
Each concept that is used to build a mental representation occurs through a pattern 
of neural firing. So if we wanted to represent the verbal representation DOG, a population 
of neurons will fire indicating DOG. Through the neural simulator, NENGO, populations 
of neurons can be defined in terms of what they represent, and connections between 
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neural populations can be formed in terms of computations performed on synaptic 
connections (Thagard & Stewart, 2014).  
We can now bind this VERBAL concept, DOG, as it is represented by a pattern of 
firing neurons, to another concept, BLACK, which is represented by a sensory group of 
neurons firing. NENGO can take multiple concepts and bind them together to create 
semantic pointers.  
Convolution as a binding mechanism is distinguished from synchrony where 
representations are not simply added together by firing together. We cannot capture the 
combination of each neural population, DOG and BLACK, by simply creating an 
additive representation (Thagard & Stewart, 2014). Rather, we need a pattern that reflects 
a unique combination but also allows each representation to be distinguishable from the 
other after they are bound. In other words, their combined form must be capable of being 
unpacked to reveal each other. 
If the verbal system represents DOG and the sensory system represents BLACK 
then the bound semantic pointer will be VERBAL*DOG + SENSORY*BLACK where * 
denotes the process of convolution. Through convolution, if given the unique pattern and 
one of the original Semantic Pointers, the other original Semantic pointer can be 
recovered (Thagard & Stewart, 2014).  
The final mechanism, competition, is what allows mental representations to break 
into the threshold of consciousness. There are thousands of mental representations being 
formed unconsciously, allowing for only certain patterns of neural firing to reach a 
threshold of activation sufficient for conscious awareness (Thagard & Stewart, 2014).  
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In the case of VERBAL*DOG, we want this concept to be positively associated 
with SENSORY*DOG (since they tend to occur together), but negatively associated with 
SENSORY*CAT. The connection strengths for these neurons are simulated using NEF 
and a function that enhances and suppresses patterns in competition (Thagard & Stewart, 
2014).  
Semantic Pointers can also explain more complex qualitative experiences. For 
example, the experience of pain is explained as a result of sensory inputs that cause the 
binding of mental representations of negative emotion, bodily location, self, and even the 
verbal representation, “I have a pain in my toe” (Thagard & Stewart, 2014, pg. 77). 
Perceptual experiences like taste, touch, sound, smell, proprioception, temperature, and 
bladder fullness result from different Semantic Pointers and their respective sensory 
inputs. These perceptual experiences, especially in imagination and dreaming, are not 
always the direct result of perception because the brain can store neural patterns and 
reactivate them in memory (Thagard & Stewart, 2014). 
Emotions are important mental representations that involve sensory inputs, 
especially for bodily awareness, but also a cognitive appraisal of these bodily states. This 
appraisal is in terms of goal acquisition like survival and reproduction (Thagard & 
Stewart, 2014; Thagard & Aubie, 2008).  Specific conscious emotions are the result of 
particular patterns of neural firing and binding that allow one to differentiate among 
various emotional experiences.  
Semantic Pointer theory also examines why we can experience differences in 
particular emotional experiences. Why are there differences in what it is like to 
experience the same kind of emotion eg. in pain, in love, in the desert (Thagard & 
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Stewart, 2014)? Based on the three main mechanisms of consciousness, representation, 
binding, and competition, different sensory inputs will result in different binding patterns 
and further particular mental representations that outcompete other representations.  
    
B. The Evolutionary Approach 
The evolutionary approach builds on the classic Darwinian functionalist tradition. 
By utilizing the perceive-think-act cycle, evolutionary psychologist, Michael Tomasello, 
has posited the rough evolutionary origins and progression of human thinking in general 
(Tomasello, 2014).  
What is notable about Tomasello’s approach is his reliance on the concept of 
intentionality, Franz Brentano’s mark of the mental. For Tomasello, intentionality is a 
common occurrence among apes and humans. But what makes for a truly human 
consciousness is a kind of shared intentionality. In other words, the distinct way in which 
human consciousness directs itself toward and represents the world by means of social 
cooperation and communication. Intentionality becomes collective.  
The shared intentionality hypothesis states that simple type-2 thinking processes 
are common to many animals, including close evolutionary cousins, the great apes 
(Tomasello, 2014). Tomasello cites and describes various experiments with apes to 
demonstrate the use of three basic thinking processes: 
1) Logical representation to oneself “offline”  
2) Simulating and making causal, intentional, or logical inferences based on these 
representations 
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3) Self-monitoring and evaluating how these experiences might lead to specific 
behavioural outcomes (through cognitive and behavioural self-monitoring)  
These are key components of rational/reflective thinking but the distinctive 
feature of human thought lies in the social conventionalization of these processes.  As 
such, distinctly human thinking involving language and culture are derived from these 
processes (Tomasello, 2014).   
 
Individual intentionality 
The three basic thinking processes afford the organism flexible decision-making 
through 1) behavioural control and 2) the ability to represent and make inferences. These 
processes function much like a feedback control system, complete with goal-directed 
action already built in. It is only once the organism has developed a foundation of thought 
and action accrued to basic goals, that simple stimulus-response associations complexify 
into today’s cognition (Tomasello, 2014).  
As the world becomes less predictable, organisms evolve cognitive and decision-
making processes that enable the individual to react to novel situations. The individual 
must have some understanding of the causal and intentional relations, which affords an 
appropriate response (Tomasello, 2014). 
A competent organism operates with reference to values and goals, awareness of 
relevant causal and intentional properties of the situation, and chooses and acts in order to 
fulfill that goal or value. This is reminiscent of the belief-desire model of rational action: 
“a goal/desire coupled with an epistemic connection to the world (e.g. a belief based on 
an understanding of the causal or intentional structure of the situation) creates an 
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intention to act” (Tomasello, 2014, pg. 9).  For a self-regulated, goal-directed organism, 
thinking is imagining the possibilities of action before actually acting - “offline 
simulation” (Tomasello, 2014, pg. 9). In other words, trying to predict and act 
accordingly. 
 
Origins of human thought in general 
In delineating our historical development as a species, Tomasello marks two key 
steps in our evolution: the development of pre-linguistic symbolic communication, and 
the development of fully objective-reflective-normative thinking. Respectively, these are 
joint intentionality and collective intentionality.  
For Tomasello, joint intentionality marks a new type of cooperative 
communication based on natural gestures of pointing and pantomiming (2014, pg. 5). The 
use of gestures allows for pairs of individuals to better coordinate their efforts with a joint 
goal in mind. Essentially, before there were groups of individuals communicating 
linguistically, there were pairs of individuals who devised communicative gestures for 
collaborative hunting and gathering.  
These new forms of communication evolved through a novel type of small-scale 
collaboration in human foraging. Exactly when this happened in human evolution is hard 
to pinpoint, but Tomasello hypothesizes that it began soon after the emergence of the 
genus Homo about 2 million years ago (2014). It is speculated that there was a great 
expansion of terrestrial monkeys who started to outcompete humans for sustenance, 
usually fruits and other vegetation (Tomasello, 2014). As such, humans needed a new 
foraging niche to survive.  
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At first this niche may have been in the form of scavenging meat, requiring 
groups of individuals to scare off animals that initially made the kill. But this small-scale 
scavenging is said to have eventually culminated in more collaborative hunting and 
gathering of plant foods and large game (Tomasello, 2014). This culmination would have 
occurred about 400,000 years ago with the common ancestor to Neanderthals and 
humans, Homo heidelbergensis. This is a time when both population and brain size were 
expanding rapidly (Gowlet et al., 2012, as cited in Tomasello, 2014).  
As such, human life changed dramatically, where individuals could no longer 
attain daily nutrition alone. Instead, they needed to develop the skills and motivation for 
interdependent collaboration. This resulted in selective pressure for cooperative 
individuals. Humans began making evaluative judgements about partners, such that 
dominance or deception was selected against. Early humans started to develop a special 
concern for evaluating others and how others were evaluating them (Tomasello, 2014). 
Early humans’ behavioural self-monitoring would become second-personal rather than 
solely first-personal.  
As well, humans started a kind of recursive mind reading in order to coordinate 
their intentions. For a gesture to mean something to a partner, individuals must be 
thinking about what their partner is thinking, and what their partner is thinking about 
them thinking about them, etc. Individuals make recursive inferences about their 
partner’s mental states and their own. Essentially, gestures would be developed with a 
concern for what the other was thinking about their thinking about their thinking about 
them, and so on. This early form of theory of mind allowed for the coordination of 
individual intentionality through gestures (Tomasello, 2014). 
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But this recursive mind reading does not lead to an infinite regress of individuals 
thinking about their partner’s thinking about their thinking about them, etc. (Tomasello, 
2014). For gestures to be mutually understood through recursive inferences about mental 
states, some common ground between partners is needed. Partners need to represent the 
situation’s goal from both perspectives. Essentially, symbolic representation through 
gesture is perspectival. A telling example of how simple pointing might have evolved, 
has us imagine two early humans attempting to obtain honey from a beehive hanging 
high from a tree branch (Tomasello, 2014). One partner sees the other struggling to reach 
the beehive, while the struggling partner sees a nearby stick. In representing the situation 
from both perspectives, the struggling individual may simply point to the stick. Given 
that both individuals represent the same goal from different perspectives, the other 
individual might realize through recursive inference and second-personal self-monitoring 
that their partner wants the stick (Tomasello, 2014). Pointing only means something if 
both perspectives are considered with respect to the goal.  
These three features of human thinking, representation, inference, and self-
monitoring, are key cognitive processes that lead to fully collective intentionality 
(Tomasello, 2014). At this early stage, all three are solely second-personal, meaning that 
they are intended for a partner who shares the same common ground found in a particular 
foraging or hunting situation. But as human populations began growing in size, they 
started competing with other large groups of humans as well. Eventually this competition 
resulted in large-scale conventionalization of symbolic gestures, the impetus for spoken 
language.  
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This marks the evolution of collective intentionality from joint intentionality. 
During this historical second step, perspectival representation develops not only for a 
partner or a few other individuals, but for an entire civilization. Representation becomes 
fully objective, where individuals represent situations from the entire group’s point of 
view with a culturally contingent system of symbolic representation. As well, recursive 
inferences about others and the self become deeply self-reflective; other’s culturally 
enmeshed opinions begin to define the self interdependently. Finally, behavioural self-
monitoring develops from the second-personal stage to the fully normative stage. 
Monitoring my behaviour is juxtaposed not only to a partner, but with respect to reasoned 
opinions of a particular society. Given full social conventionalization of human thinking, 
collective intentionality not only defines groups of individuals – it defines the social 
nature of human thinking. Tomasello calls this fully human collective intentionality – 
objective-reflective-normative thinking (2014).  
The background set of meanings needed for self-understanding is provided by the 
social world, seen through two key stages of evolutionary development. Social 
communication in survival situations allowed us to accomplish more complex goal-
directed behaviour, firstly through joint intentions toward a shared goal. Perception and 
cognition continued to complexify with adaptation in precarious goal-directed situations. 
Finally, symbolic communicative gestures diversified into collectively understood verbal 
representations. The collective use of imagistic and verbal symbols to describe situations 
and accomplish goals marks the first instances of human language and culture 
(Tomasello, 2014).  
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The world as conceptualized through these representations can then be reduced to 
functional computational mechanisms. Together, Tomasello and Thagard’s approaches 
provide a mechanistic account of the mind. We can explain the use of mental 
representations and even the origins of self-reflective representation across evolutionary 
history. But we may still ask about this self-reflective experience. There is still something 
to say about what it is like to be functionally operative in the world as a self-reflective 
language-using being; the fact that I can describe this experience at all.  
In the language of psychology, the mechanistic understanding of experience is at 
any time presupposed. Meaning and experience stand under the functional construal of 
mental states in reference to behaviour, stemming from historical developments in 
psychology. As such, major reductive and functional movements have critically impacted 
how we foundationally understand the meaning of human experience. But as self-
reflexive beings, we have the capacity to further question the meaning of conscious 
experience, as it appears to us, and without presupposing its meaning in reference to 
behaviour. 
We each actively adopt the meanings of our world in a way more basic than the 
theoretical paradigm of perception, thought, and action. There is something it is like for 
each of us to be consciously engaged in the world. Understanding this primordial unity 
where mind, body, and social world are dialectically joined to each other requires the 
phenomenological reduction. By suspending our natural mechanistic attitude we can 
examine experience as encountered.  We can thus return to the way our meaningful 
experience is already occurring in the world, operating in a pre-theoretical fashion. 
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Through phenomenology, we can return to the things themselves and their basic 
significance to us, as opposed to their mechanistic description.  
However, this does not mean that any phenomenological reduction will provide us 
with the correct intrinsic qualities of consciousness. In the next section, criticism of 
Husserl’s original phenomenological reduction will be examined, along with Heidegger’s 
solution to the limits of the introspective subject. 
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Chapter 4: The Existential Project for Phenomenology 
We can now attempt to provide an answer to the hard problem of consciousness 
through phenomenological methods. I first account for criticism of Husserl’s 
phenomenology as an introspective method, and then how Heidegger’s existential 
phenomenology addresses these concerns. Centrally, Heidegger describes how time, 
meaning, and self-interpretation within a personal history are fundamental structures of 
the human experience. Self-representation in time, as consciousness from beginning to 
end, identifies the self within the meanings of one’s culturally embedded upbringing. 
Through Heidegger’s temporal description of consciousness, the mechanistic meaning 
imposed by the history of psychology can be destructured.  
While Heidegger provides only one possible phenomenological interpretation 
among many of the human being, the psychological understanding is also seen in his 
investigation as only one interpretation the human being adopts in describing conscious 
experience.  
 
Phenomenology and the existential gestalt 
In the science of mind, consciousness is explained by causal mechanisms. The 
computational analogy and the evolutionary approach provide an account of human 
experience all within a material universe. But the human being is capable of expressing a 
world that takes place within the bounds of human existence itself. We can accept the 
facts of consciousness and its emergent mechanisms, but we also try to understand our 
particular human experience. One suspends a solely mechanistic interpretation of 
consciousness and returns to the experience itself.  
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From the first-person perspective, we begin by describing how consciousness 
unfolds in time. We might think about episodes in our past, as they affect who we are 
now, or project ourselves to the future, where we predict how past and present may come 
together. The meaning given to this first-person autobiography as a whole in time, starts 
with me, so it is mine; I must own up to it.  
In positing a secondary phenomenal ontology to the physical, the Hard Problem 
provides the contemporary route for exploring this idea.3 “Phenomenology” represents a 
minor history of the mind that was cultivated within, yet held in opposition to, the major 
narrative of psychology. Phenomenology interprets human experience by understanding 
its experiential layers, rather than its causal mechanisms. It attempts to express in its own 
language the meanings ascribed in human experience as experienced from the first-
person perspective. It presupposes nothing beyond the phenomenon of consciousness. 
A terminological debate of whether there actually is a so-called phenomenal 
realm is also suspended for the sake of examining what consciousness itself entails. If we 
are to decide whether all my hopes, dreams, fears, beliefs, emotions, and desires are fully 
described by mechanistic explanations, we should also examine whether consciousness as 
we experience it, as it contains emergent personal experiences for the subject, entails 
something greater than its mechanistic parts. We can explain how consciousness arises in 
the world, but understanding its first-personal phenomenology should be carried out.   
The missing ingredient of the Hard Problem is an understanding that despite our 
best theories, which can be generalized to all human beings, we are self-reflexive beings 
who interpret the meaning of their own experience. After we turn from the natural 
																																																								3	For	example,	see	L.A.	Paul’s	Transformative	Experience	(2014)	
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attitude to make sense of our experience as we encounter it, we want to know why it 
occurs as we find it – “why there is something; why we are as we are, dying and dead; 
why we believe in transcendent beings which are physical, or otherwise inclined” 
(Holmes, 1995, pg. 8). The fact that phenomenology exists, where consciousness turns 
toward itself to understand the world, says something more fundamental about the nature 
of consciousness.  
 Phenomenology acknowledges that I can abstract the concept of existence within 
my particular stream of experience. Given one’s upbringing and psychological history, it 
asserts that I have my own dealings with the world. Husserl was right to claim the slogan 
of phenomenology - ‘back to the things themselves!’ – for the method provides a 
description of a particular way of encountering objects in the world; a style or way of 
being. It is a conscious examination of one’s intersection with reality, in all its details and 
ambiguities as they are prejudicially drawn. One turns away from the mechanism of 
emergence, instead focusing on the unfolding of one’s history. For once I am conscious 
of an upbringing, demarcating my beginning and end, my experience is infected by the 
possibilities of interpretation. What do I think about this thing I call life, in all its 
finitude? It will end, yet I go on with a meaningful understanding of the world as I live it. 
Phenomenologist Richard Holmes provides a good explication of this existential 
stream of thought as it arises through the phenomenological reduction: “We naturally 
accept the “real” world as existing independent of our consciousness of it, as consistent 
and constant, as peopled by others like ourselves, and all of us as finite. But we can and 
do ask “why”, wonder about our wonder, and so take a radical critical stance which is a 
break with the natural attitude” (Holmes, 1995, pg. 9). 
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Recall that Titchener’s original structural distinction between mind and 
consciousness was temporal. Consciousness was only a section of the larger mind-stream 
where mind referred to all conscious states within the life-time of an individual (1909). 
What follows as the individual suspends the natural attitude is the wonder of existence 
itself, in realizing its eventual ending, and its meaning as a whole: “Witness my wonder 
about my own death – I who am aware of the limit of my possibilities sees himself 
delimited as possibly no longer aware of his ongoing life. To note this limit and reflect on 
why this is so, and how it affects, or infects, the rest of my existence, requires a turning to 
an attitude of reflection which is no longer situated in the natural attitude wherein what 
takes place is straightforwardly accepted” (Holmes, 1995, pg. 9).  
The phenomenological reduction plays an integral part in existential thought in 
directing our attention to the whole of existence. The wonder of existence allows us to 
realize how individual consciousness passing from beginning to end composes the world 
in a way disconnected from the way we conceptualize the passing of others and other 
objects: “This can be seen as I mourn the death of another person. I can see it as any other 
passing away or change in my world – the snow for skiing melts, spring flowers fade, and 
there is no more food on my plate – but I can and do experience, and possibly reflect on, 
the vision, or its lack, of a future world in which I am not (snow, flowers, and food 
without me), and thereby turn to a wonder about why this is so and, perhaps, how I 
should deal with my own death”(Holmes, 1995, pg. 10).  
Existence unfolds in time through an awareness of one’s being, and the being of 
things in general, so we turn to understand the meaning of being: “What happens at this 
stage of wonder is the realization that this objectivity, my own death, has to be assessed 
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as it has come to be constituted in and through my conscious processes. More generally, 
whatever sense any objectivity, any thing, event, and so forth has for me comes by way 
of these conscious processes and must be explicated” (Holmes, 1995, pg. 10). 
 In this constituting fashion, we achieve a “transcendental turn”, or an explication 
of one’s sense of the world which transcends the natural attitude: “What happens, I would 
submit, as we wonder about death is a shift of focus from our experience, as what is 
experienced as in the world…to an attitude of one who is not “in” the world…To make 
this break is the natural outcome of wonder, which leads to radical wonder, whose goal is 
the explication of all objectivities as they have been and can be constituted” (Holmes, 
1995, pg.10).  
If we take consciousness as the act itself, of intentionally experiencing the world, 
we should provide some description of its existence as such. One of the simplest 
distinctions is to say that there is a beginning and an end.    
If there is an end to this experience and we are motivated to provide an 
explanation of this coherent whole, then what kind of teleology is built within the 
conscious timeline that defines life and death? Understanding this teleology requires an 
account of conscious experience as it exists in time. 
Heidegger undertakes such an investigation, but first we must address the major 
criticism against introspection coming from scientific psychology. In order to speak about 
this existential timeline, and decide what this conscious experience means to us in the 
end, we must see beyond a strictly psychological paradigm.   
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A common critique of Husserl’s methodology  
Husserl marks a major division from the science of psychology. Instead of mental 
states being construed as functional dispositions to behavior, the quality of their 
conscious appearance is examined. Like Descartes, Husserl reestablished the centrality of 
the human subject in its conscious apprehension of the world. Husserl wanted to describe 
our experiences from the first-person perspective (Zahavi, 2003).   
Husserl was concerned with the question of what it means to be conscious 
(Zahavi, 2003). This does not refer to an analysis of the empirical conditions for humans 
to be conscious, but rather the transcendental conditions through an analysis of what 
consciousness as such implies (Zahavi, 2003). By seizing experiential certainty, the 
phenomenological reduction claims to provide the basis for knowledge.   
Indeed, unlike the sciences, it asks what makes any sort of knowledge possible in 
the first place. Husserl’s methodology was transcendental in its investigation of conscious 
appearances, as well as these appearances’ role in elucidating the conditions for the 
possibility of having an experience. But it also broke away from Kant’s original inability 
to solve the problem of how the mind can know objects outside it (Eagleton, 2003). In 
claiming that what is given in pure perception is the very essence of things, Husserl 
sought to overcome this skepticism.  
The greatest criticism of Husserl’s original phenomenological method is its close 
association to Cartesian introspection. It claims to know reality through a limited first-
person perspective. Husserl’s phenomenological reduction is often considered solipsistic:  
The phenomenological reduction seems to “restrict the field of research…to the 
phenomenologizing individual's own consciousness and phenomena. If the 
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purpose of the intentional-constitutive analysis is to investigate the world’s 
givenness for me, how should it then ever be capable of disclosing the world’s 
givenness for another subject?...If one is meaningfully to speak of a foreign 
subject, of an Other, it is evident that we are dealing with something that cannot 
be reduced to its mere givenness for me (Zahavi, 2003, pg. 109).  
The mistrust of introspective methods that started with Descartes, and carried on 
to the structuralists and gestaltists continues to influence critics of phenomenology. In 
reducing the world to a single consciousness, Husserl appears to disregard experience’s 
inherent social nature: 
Husserl speaks of a purely private or internal sphere of experience; but such a 
sphere is in fact a fiction, since all experience involves language and language is 
ineradicably social. To claim that I am having a wholly private experience is 
meaningless: I would not be able to have an experience in the first place unless it 
took place in the terms of some language within which I could identify it. What 
supplies meaningfulness to my experience for Husserl is not language but the act 
of perceiving particular phenomena as universals – an act which is supposed to 
occur independently of language itself…How can I possibly come to possess 
meanings without already having a language is a question which Husserl’s system 
is incapable of answering (Eagleton, 2003, pg. 52).  
Wittgenstein recognized that meaning is not something expressed or reflected in 
language: it is actually produced by it (1953). In other words, meaning is created by its 
use in experience: “It is not as though we have meanings or experience which we then 
proceed to cloak with words; we can only have the meanings and experiences in the first 
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place because we have a language” (Eagleton, 2003, pg. 52). There can be no such thing 
as a private language as our experience as individuals appears to be social to its roots. 
Meaning is created in an ongoing game of its collective use.  
If we turn to Tomasello’s evolutionary account of intentionality, we find 
empirical evidence to support this view. The idea of a self-interpreting human only 
emerges after cooperative gesture and communication across an evolutionary history 
(Tomasello, 2014). Without there being others through which we can objectively 
perceive our action as a means to a goal, and whose perspective we license as a 
normative standard, there would be no self-reflective experience. Concepts were 
developed and adopted from others’ use.  
Dan Zahavi disagrees with this charge of solipsism, and provides some evidence 
of Husserl’s unpublished work on intersubjectivity: “Husserl took intersubjectivity very 
seriously…he claims that the subject can only be world-experiencing insofar as it is a 
member of a community, that is, as a member of a sociality, and that a radical self-
reflection necessarily leads to the discovery of absolute intersubjectivity” (Zahavi, 2003, 
pg. 121).  
Richard Holmes has written against this charge as well: “Before proceeding, I 
want to allay suspicions that phenomenology is a blatant form of subjectivistic, solipsistic 
idealism – worse by far than that of Berkeley, who at least had the decency to believe in 
God as the origin of the stuff of our experience” (Holmes, 1995, pg. 8).  
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Heidegger and phenomenology 
The recognition that meaning is socio-historical led Husserl’s most celebrated 
pupil, Martin Heidegger, to break from his system of thought (Eagleton, 2003, pg. 53). 
While Husserl appears to start with a Cartesian mode of inquiry, Heidegger rejects this 
starting-point, beginning with our most occupied way of living in the world; what 
Wittgenstein might call, the form of life (1953, para. 19, 241). The human being is 
always and already interacting with the world in a familiar way before we ever begin to 
doubt the connection between mind, body, and world. There is no “I think” in this natural 
engagement.  
Instead, Heidegger sought to untangle the connection between the meaning given 
by the socio-historical world and the human being through a new kind of 
phenomenological analysis. Heidegger treats appearances, in their familiar presentation 
to consciousness, as ontological phenomena. “What it is like” for a human subject 
embodies an understanding of what it means to be a human being with this kind of 
consciousness. In beginning with this familiar way we interact with the world, Heidegger 
thought that the meaning of Being in general – a foundational study of ontology - could 
be disclosed in connection to human being’s awareness of finite existence in time.  
In Kant and the Problem of Metaphysics, Heidegger provides an account of 
Kant’s first critique that serves to lay the ground for an inquiry into the Question of Being 
(Heidegger, 1929/1997). Heidegger interprets Kant’s transcendental conditions as a 
foundation for a more primordial understanding of Being in general. He saw this more 
general question leading to an overlapping inquiry with Scholastic Metaphysics: “The 
Kantian laying of the ground for metaphysics began with the grounding of what underlies 
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authentic metaphysics, or Metaphysica Specialis…[that is,] Metaphysica Generalis. This, 
however – as “ontology” – is already the form which has been consolidated into a 
discipline, the form of what, in Antiquity and finally with Aristotle, remains established 
as a problem of…authentic philosophizing” (Heidegger, 1929/1997, pg. 154). The 
“finitude of Dasein” would be Heidegger’s attempt to regain the Greek sense of limit and 
mortality, but through an original elaboration of anxiety, death, and authentic existence 
(Krell, 2008, pg. 23).  
Heidegger’s mode of inquiry is still noticeably phenomenological. It can be seen 
as an application of phenomenology to the study of Being in general. Phenomenological 
analysis of the human being provides conditions for the ontological analysis of Being in 
general. In other words, Heidegger’s analysis is existential-ontological: 
Being is to be laid hold of and made our theme. Being is always being of beings 
and accordingly it becomes accessible at first only by starting with some being. 
Here the phenomenological vision which does the apprehending must indeed 
direct itself toward a being, but it has to do so in such a way that the being of this 
being is thereby brought out so that it may be possible to mathematise it. 
Apprehension of being, ontological investigation, always turns, at first and 
necessarily, to some being; but then, in a precise way, it is led away from that 
being and led back to its being. We call this basic component of 
phenomenological method - the leading back or reduction of investigative vision 
from a naively apprehended being to being, phenomenological reduction. 
(Heidegger, 1927/1988, pg. 18) 
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The leading away and back terminology is used by Heidegger to characterize his 
and Husserl’s phenomenological reduction. Husserl suspends our natural attitude such 
that we are not necessarily denying, neglecting, abandoning, or excluding the reality of 
appearances, but rather bracketing their validity. Heidegger’s change in attitude toward 
reality leads us back to appearances, but as a way to disclose ontological structure.   
Heidegger’s analysis treats the being that apprehends these appearances as the 
initial object of ontological study. Heidegger’s phenomenology begins foremost with the 
entity that questions its being, the human being: “We are defining this being 
terminologically as Dasein…Scientific research is neither the sole nor the primary kind of 
possible Being of this being. Moreover, Dasein itself is distinctly different from other 
beings. We must make this distinct difference visible in a preliminary way…Dasein is a 
being that does not simply occur among other beings. Rather it is ontically distinguished 
by the fact that in its Being this being is concerned about its very being” (Heidegger, 
1927/1962, pg. 12).4 
Heidegger seeks an understanding of the human being whose own search for 
being is inevitably entangled with the question of Being in general. Human beings are 
“special kinds of beings in that their way of being embodies an understanding of what it 
is to be” (Dreyfus, 1991, pg. 15). Through a change in attitude toward our being, as 
entities that question the meaning of being, we can be brought back to the underlying 
nature of Being in general. Distinguished in the world among other beings that do not 
conceive of themselves as such, Heidegger seeks a phenomenological reduction of our 
being-in-the-world, or Dasein: 																																																								4	When	citing	Being	and	Time	(1927/1962),	pagination	from	the	original	German	version	will	be	used.	
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We are thus adopting a central term of Husserl's phenomenology in its literal 
wording though not in its substantive intent. For Husserl the phenomenological 
reduction…is the method of leading phenomenological vision from the natural 
attitude of the human being whose life is involved in the world of things and 
persons back to the transcendental life of consciousness and its noetic-noematic 
experiences, in which objects are constituted as correlates of consciousness. For 
us phenomenological reduction means leading phenomenological vision back 
from the apprehension of a being, whatever may be the character of that 
apprehension, to the understanding of the being of this being (projecting upon the 
way it is unconcealed). Like every other scientific method, phenomenological 
method grows and changes due to the progress made precisely with its help into 
the subjects under investigation (Heidegger, 1927/1988, pg. 18).  
 
Dasein  
Heidegger characterizes Husserl’s phenomenological reduction as a bringing back 
or leading towards conscious appearances through an understanding of the conditions for 
their conceptual structure. On the other hand, an understanding of Being seeks to bring 
one back to the structure of what it means for there to be this consciousness which seeks 
an understanding of its being. That is, bringing one back from the apprehension of a 
being (the human being), to an understanding of what it means for there to be a being 
who apprehends its being. Characterizing the nature of Being in general requires an 
ontological investigation of human being as Dasein. The existential-ontological analysis 
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of Dasein is open to us through a change in attitude toward our everyday conscious 
experience.  
Dasein roughly translates as being-in-the-world or being-there. However, a better 
way to put it is to say that Dasein describes the there of being. As such, Dasein does not 
designate the human being itself, but rather its way of being in the world: “When we 
designate this entity with the term ‘Dasein’, we are expressing not its ‘what’ (as if it were 
a table, house, or tree) but its Being (Heidegger, 1927/1962, pg. 42). Dasein’s activity in 
the world creates a stand it is taking on what it is to be Dasein: “Its ownmost Being is 
such that it has an understanding of that Being, and already maintains itself in each case 
as if its Being has been interpreted in some manner” (Heidegger, 1927/1962, pg. 15). 
This self-interpreting way of being is existence: “That kind of being towards which 
Dasein can comport itself in one way or another, and always does comport itself 
somehow, we call “existence” (Heidegger, 1927/1962, pg. 12). 
Heidegger coins two terms to describe the way Dasein exists or is there in the 
world: existentiell and existential kinds of understanding (Heidegger, 1927/1962, pg. 12). 
These are two ways that Dasein understands its existence. Existentiell understanding 
designates the way that Dasein seizes or ignores various possibilities of its 
interpretedness of its being – that is, by living its life (Heidegger, 1927/1962, pg. 12). 
Dasein chooses these possibilities itself, stumbles upon them, or already grows up in 
them (Heidegger, 1927/1962). One of these possibilities is to question the very structure 
of life and its possibilities, which is Dasein’s distinctive ontic feature – it questions the 
meaning of being, or in other words, is ontological (Heidegger, 1927/1962, pg. 13). This 
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leads to the next mode of understanding, existential understanding – it attempts to answer 
the question concerning the structure of existence (Heidegger, 1927/1962, pg. 14).  
The question of structure attempts to analyze what constitutes existence, where 
the coherence of these structures is called existentiality (Heidegger, 1927/1962, pg. 12-
13). In contrast to existentiell understanding that examines the various possibilities that 
can be seized or ignored by Dasein for self-interpretation (eg. A mother, a fighter, a man, 
a machine, a care-taker, or a homo sapien), existential understanding tries to provide the 
ontological structure of these possibilities. What belongs to the structure of Dasein is 
called an existential (Heidegger, 1927/1962). Phenomenologist, Edith Stein provides a 
quick inventory of some of these existentials and their explanations, eg.,“in-the-world”, 
“being-in”, “care”, and the “who”. 
Dasein’s “in-the-world” is not the totality of objects present-at-hand, nor a certain 
spatial area of beings, but rather that wherein a Dasein lives (Stein, 2007, pg. 58). 
“Being-in” also has nothing to do with spatiality. Rather, as an existential, being-in 
belongs to Dasein’s mode of being (Stein, 2007). As being-in-the-world, this is always 
characterized by care. As an existential, care marks our dealings with the world, and 
arises on the basis of a familiarity with the world (Stein, 2007).  
Dasein finds itself concerned with certain projects, objects, or people in the world, 
which it understands in a familiar way. With this familiarity, Dasein deals with things in 
its world not as merely present-at-hand, but as equipment which are ready-to-hand 
(Heidegger, 1927/1962). Dasein’s dealings are already understood as to be for something 
through care (Stein, 2007). It is only when ready-at-hand phenomena break or become 
useless that they become merely present-at-hand objects.  
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Indeed, Dasein is not a present-at-hand, a “what”, but instead is a “who” 
(Heidegger, 1927/1962; Stein, 2007, pg. 58). For Heidegger, the essence of Dasein lies in 
its existence, and its searching for the nature of being (Heidegger, 1927/1962, pg. 42). 
Unlike material objects which are simply present-at-hand to Dasein or entities whose 
self-identity is of no concern, Dasein actively takes up its being (the who) as a question, 
while present-at-hand objects (the what), do not. Indeed, “the essential definition of this 
being cannot be accomplished by ascribing to it a “what” that specifies its material 
content, because its essence lies rather in the fact that it has always to be its Being as its 
own” (Heidegger, 1927/1962, pg. 12). In other words, Dasein relates to itself intimately 
by questioning the meaning of existence. This is an integral part of what it means for 
Dasein to have the kind of existence it has. For each Dasein, the search for the meaning 
of being is its own:  
That Being which is an issue for this entity in its very Being is in each case mine. 
Thus Dasein is never to be taken ontologically as an instance or special case of 
some genus of entities as things that are present-at-hand. To entities such as these, 
their Being is ‘a matter of indifference, or more precisely, they ‘are’ such that 
their Being can be neither a matter of indifference to them, nor the opposite. 
Because Dasein has in each case mineness one must always use a personal 
pronoun when one addresses it: ‘I am’, ‘you are’ (Heidegger, 1927/1962, pg. 43).    
As such, the primary characteristics of our being as Dasein are 1) the priority of 
existence over essence, where our way of being is to find its being rather than be 
predefined as a “what”, and 2) that this being as Dasein is in each case mine. The who of 
Dasein is not a present-at-hand substance, but rather a form of existence: “The human 
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being’s substance is not the spirit as a synthesis of soul and body; it is rather existence” 
(Heidegger, 1927/1962, pg. 117). Through the possibility of realizing its authentic being, 
Dasein does not “have” this possibility; rather it is this possibility as a mode of being. 
Dasein’s proper mode of being is its having-to-become-itself (Stein, 2007):    
Dasein does not have the kind of Being which belongs to something merely 
present-at-hand within the world, nor does it ever have it…The right way of 
presenting it is so far from self-evident that to determine what form it shall take is 
itself an essential part of the ontological analytic of this entity…In determining 
itself as an entity, Dasein always does so in the light of a possibility which it is 
itself and which, in its very Being, it somehow understands. This is the formal 
meaning of Dasein’s existential constitution. But this tells us that if we are to 
interpret this entity ontologically, the problematic of its Being must be developed 
from the existentiality of its existence. This cannot mean, however, that Dasein is 
to be construed in terms of some concrete possible idea of existence…Dasein 
should not be Interpreted with the differentiated character of some definite way of 
existing…it should be uncovered in the undifferentiated character which it has 
proximally and for the most part (Heidegger, 1927/1962, pg. 44).   
 
Dasein and time 
What is this undifferentiated character that Dasein must sift through in order to 
find its proper mode of being? This is Dasein as contemplated in its everydayness (Stein, 
2007, pg. 58). In other words, the ontological structure of Dasein’s existentiell 
understanding, or the structures through which Dasein seizes or ignores various 
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possibilities for interpreting its being. We must find an interpretation of Dasein which 
does not designate its being in any presupposed “self-evident” way.  The access that 
Dasein has to its Being must be disclosed in an interpretation that allows Dasein to “show 
itself to itself on its own terms” but through the undifferentiated character of its everyday 
familiar existence (Heidegger, 1927/1962, pg. 16).  
The path to understanding Dasein as the possibility of becoming itself lies in its 
relation to time. This relation can be seen as having two parts. Firstly, time as the 
condition for the possibility of having a human meaning of existence as Dasein. 
Secondly, the constant influence of time and history on the meaning Dasein derives from 
its experience.  
Indeed, the meaningful human history that Dasein is always involved with in the 
world provides the basis for deriving a meaning for being. However, a meaningful human 
history arises on the basis of temporality. Thus, time is also the condition for the 
possibility of human history. As a condition for the possibility of Dasein’s temporal mode 
of being, history is grounded by historicity:  
But temporality is at the same time the condition of the possibility of historicity as 
a temporal mode of being of Dasein…historicity is prior to what is called history 
(world-historical occurrences). Historicity means the constitution of Being of the 
“occurrence” of Dasein as such; it is the ground for the fact that something like 
the discipline of “world history” is at all possible and historically belongs to 
world history (Heidegger, 1927/1962, pg. 19-20). 
As being-in-the-world, Dasein lives within this already established historical 
world. This is the undifferentiated worldly character Dasein already belongs to as being 
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in the world. In taking up an interpretation of itself within the world, Dasein manifests 
itself through its future, but only as this future is already interpreted by the past: 
Dasein “is” its past in the manner of its Being which, roughly expressed actually 
“occurs” out of its future…This understanding discloses the possibilities of its 
Being and regulates them. Its own past – and that always means that of its 
“generation” – does not follow after Dasein but rather always goes already ahead 
of it (Heidegger, 1927/1962, pg. 20). 
Dasein is projected or “thrown” out of the historical past toward the future, which 
it must come to terms with in the present through care. Dasein also understands its future 
possibilities through its interpretation of the past.  
In both cases, whether in present familiar dealings with the world, or in 
projections toward the future, Dasein is always and already ahead of itself through care. 
Heidegger calls this thrownness “facticity” which “as a kind of being, belongs to a being 
which in each case is its possibilities and is them in such a way it understands itself in 
these possibilities, projecting itself upon them” (Heidegger, 1927/1962, pg. 181). 
Through this temporal structure, the undifferentiated character of everyday 
existence prompts self-interpretation. Indeed, this is Dasein’s ontological nature as a 
temporal being who questions its own being. It is an escape from the same natural 
attitude Husserl had in mind: 
The everyday way in which things have been interpreted is one into which Dasein 
has grown in the first instance, with never a possibility of extrication. In it, out of 
it, and against it, all genuine understanding, interpreting, and communicating, all 
re-discovering and appropriating anew, are performed. In no case is a Dasein 
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untouched and unseduced by this way in which things have been interpreted 
(Heidegger, 1927/1962, pg. 169).  
Dasein cannot realize its own way of being by only understanding itself in this 
everyday way. Dasein is no longer that which seeks to realize its own being, but instead 
becomes objectified as a product of the tradition which it initially grows up and interprets 
itself as. The everyday factical experience of life for Dasein can fall into the objective 
meanings of the environment:   
With respect to the meaning of its being, the self can easily be experienced in an 
objectified sense… As soon as this particular burden of factical life [the past] is 
seen in terms of tradition…,the concrete possibility of bringing phenomena of 
existence into view and specifying them in genuine conception can manifest itself 
only when the concrete, relevant, and effectively experienced tradition is 
destructured, precisely in reference to the ways and means by which it specifies 
self-realizing experience (Martin Heidegger, as cited in Krell, 2008, pg. 21). 
Heidegger calls the everyday Dasein a they-self, distinguishing it from the self we 
seek to realize as Dasein. The initial everyday understanding imparted by the tradition of 
the past encroaches on Dasein’s own potentiality for being. As part of everyday 
existence, Dasein has to be-with other beings that also have the form of Dasein (Stein, 
2007, pg. 59). As an existential, being-with is not a finding of subjects that are present-at-
hand, but instead belongs to Dasein’s presupposed familiar understanding of the world as 
ready-to-hand (Stein, 2007). Being with the They and being with ready-to-hand objects 
are integral modes of being for Dasein: “Being alongside the ready-to-hand, belongs just 
as primordially to Being-in-the-world as does Being with Others” (Heidegger, 
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1927/1962, pg. 181). However, this everyday self, “is proximally and for the most part 
inauthentic, [as] the they-self” (Heidegger, 1927/1962, pg. 181).  
Dasein’s understanding of being always includes the understanding of others: 
“This understanding, like any understanding, is not an acquaintance derived from 
knowledge about them, but a primordial, existential kind of being, which makes such 
knowledge and acquaintance possible in the first place” (Heidegger, 1927/1962, pg. 123). 
Dasein is with-being-there-in-the-world in so far as its understanding of itself is 
predefined by the They (Stein, 2007).  
We may even think of this primordiality of existence in the They as an 
evolutionary primordiality, given Tomasello’s concept of collective intentionality (2014) 
and Wittgenstein’s form of life (1953). Our everyday meanings are derived from the 
They and have evolved through the They. But the everyday they-self is not its own proper 
self as such. Dasein wishes to be Dasein, or in other words, it seeks to be authentic in its 
search for being:   
The Self of everyday Dasein is the they-self, which we distinguish from the 
authentic Self – that is, from the Self which has been taken hold of in its own way. 
As they-self, the particular Dasein has been dispersed into the “they”, and must 
first find itself. This dispersal…we know as concernful absorption in the world 
we encounter as closest to us. If Dasein is familiar with itself as they-self, this 
means at the same time that the “they” itself prescribes that way of interpreting 
the world and Being-in-the-world which lies closest (Heidegger, 1927/1962, pg. 
129).  
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While the they-self is an “essential existential” as part of the ontological structure 
of Dasein, the authentic self is covered over by the they-self (Stein, 2007, pg. 59). To 
take up an authentic interpretation of itself within the everyday way of encountering the 
world is the meaning of being for Dasein: 
While we exist in the everyday, we understand ourselves in an everyday way, or 
as we can formulate it terminologically, not authentically in the strict sense of the 
word, not…from the…most extreme possibilities of our own existence, but 
inauthentically,…as we are not our own, as we have lost our self in things and 
human beings while we exist in the everyday. “Not authentically” means: not as 
we at bottom are able to own up to ourselves. Being lost, however, does not have 
a negative, depreciative significance…This everyday having of self within our 
factical, existent, passionate merging into things can surely be genuine 
(Heidegger, 1927, as cited in Krell, 2008, pg. 28). 
 
Being-towards-death 
Uncovering the authentic self is a project each person must decide for themselves. 
Dasein is involved in worldly projects and plans for the future but also fundamentally 
comes to terms with a relation to itself. Authenticity is uncovered by self-interpretation, 
thereby distancing the who of Dasein from the They.  
We can think of Dasein and its projection of possibilities as having a beginning 
and end. In other words, Dasein can be grasped as a whole in its relation to time, and its 
self-interpreted history. By examining the finitude of Dasein, we look to understand its 
existential-ontological structure as a whole. 
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Heidegger has initial worries about the potential for describing Dasein as a whole 
since the fundamental existential of care appears to always leave the nature of Dasein 
unfinished. In care, Dasein is ahead-of-itself through its projecting into the future as a 
possibility for authenticity. But in being constantly ahead-of-itself, there appears to only 
ever be a projecting, or potentiality-for-Being that never ends. Even after death, there is 
something still outstanding, or inevitably never accomplished. In the words of Edith 
Stein:  
The specificity of Dasein’s being as care, in which it is ahead of itself and 
according to which something of its being always remains outstanding seems to 
exclude an understanding of Dasein in its totality. It must therefore be shown that 
death can be grasped, and that as a consequence the entirety of Dasein can be 
grasped along with it (2007, pg. 62). 
How does Dasein grasp an understanding of death in order to understand its being 
as a whole? This outstanding must be conceptualized as a mode of being through which 
Dasein realizes its ownmost being. Dasein must interpret this end as its own. Indeed, one 
must differentiate this end from the Being of things in general:  
The ‘outstanding’, which belongs to Dasein’s being and which matures in death, 
is not the outstanding of a not yet ready-to-hand, which becomes disposable [after 
being obtained]…It is not the immaturity of the fruit which is consumed in the 
ripening, and it is not like the unfinishedness of the road ending only at the goal. 
The ending that lies in death is also not a disappearing (like the rain that 
stops)…Dying is neither identical to the ‘perishing’ of a living being, nor to the 
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demise as a passage from life to being-dead, but it is the mode of being in which 
Dasein is towards death (Stein, 2007, pg. 62). 
We are already aware of this impending end, most especially through our 
projection of the self into the future: “Being towards death is prefigured in case as the 
being-ahead-of-one-self” (Stein, 2007, pg. 63). Death is given as an insurmountable 
possibility, one that shows the finitude of our being. But death as our own is only 
revealed when we distance our understanding of its significance from the They. Death is 
our own as a being-towards-death. It is our possibility-not-to-be, “our ownmost 
possibility of being free from all relations” (Stein, 2007, pg. 63). Impending death must 
be seen not as something exterior, pushing us along toward the end, but as exposing our 
ownmost possibility to be before that time comes. The everyday understanding avoids 
death’s ownmost significance in the pacified meanings of the They: 
Idle talk makes anguish out to be fear of a threatening event…something which 
one ought not to indulge in; it does not let the courage to anguish before death 
come up…In that the ‘they’ accords to death only an empirical certainty (as a fact 
of general experience), it hides Dasein’s own authentic certainty…the specific 
certainty that death is possible at every moment, even if temporally undetermined 
(Stein, 2007, pg. 63). 
If Dasein exists as a possibility projected in time, the certainty of the possibility of 
death reveals Dasein in some of its totality. There is an end to this experience at some 
future point. In coming to terms with the anguish of being-in-the-world as being-toward-
death, Dasein’s own finitude allows for uncovering authenticity: 
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With death Dasein stands before itself in its most proper potentiality for 
Being…Its death is the possibility of being no longer able to be “there”. When 
Dasein stands before itself as this possibility it is fully directed toward its very 
own potentiality for Being. Standing before itself in this way all relations in it to 
other Daseins are dissolved….As potentiality for Being, Dasein cannot surmount 
the possibility of death….Death thus reveals itself as the most proper, 
nonrelational, insurmountable possibility (Heidegger, 1927/1962, pg. 250). 
Confronting death uncovers the open possibility for Dasein to realize its ownmost 
being. The differentiation of Dasein from the Being of things in general includes no 
longer being able to draw this distinction. I will no longer have the possibility of 
engaging in this ontological problem of being that I am living now. As Stein puts it:  
The authentic being towards death…envisages the ability-to-not-be as pure 
possibility… which it must take up itself independently of all relations…From 
inside the anguished state-of-mind this possibility poses a threat. But for its 
totality it has significance, ‘as anticipation of the unrepeatable possibility opens 
up all its presented possibilities with it’, it harbours the possibility of an 
existential anticipation of the whole of Dasein (Stein, 2007, pg. 63). 
 
Authenticity, anxiety, and finitude 
The existential phenomenology of Heidegger opens us to a new way of 
understanding consciousness – through the self-interpretation of a being in the world who 
questions its existence. Through the phenomenological reduction of our conscious 
experience as being-in-the-world we return to consciousness as a phenomenon, 
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conceptualized as a whole of finite appearances. In view of existence that extends from 
beginning to an end, we realize the need to own our way of existing.  
Heidegger would most likely disagree that the existential-ontological analysis of 
Dasein provides us with something about the nature of consciousness per se (Krell, 
2008). Instead, his analysis might be seen as something far more significant, pertaining to 
the nature of being human, and Being in general. But as we have seen through the self-
reflexive movements of the analysis, where the apprehension of Being (the general 
question) must be characterized by another being, that which apprehends Being (Dasein, 
or human being), the self-interpretive capacity of consciousness shows its potential for 
understanding the nature of being. Heidegger’s phenomenological reduction uncovers an 
analysis of consciousness as existence.   
The existential structure of consciousness involves a striving for authentic being. 
The human capacity for self-consciousness and a unique self-interpretation emerges from 
the undifferentiated consciousness of the they-self. Authenticity can then be realized in 
purview of the mineness of death and the anxiety it inspires.  
Realizing authentic existence requires each human being to confront the most 
insurmountable possibility of existence, death. In realizing that death and the possibilities 
of the future are ultimately mine, Dasein is able to differentiate itself from the they-self. 
However, what phenomenologist John Russon notes is not Heidegger’s 
acknowledgement of difference between the everyday self and authentic existence 
(Russon, 2008). Rather, it is Heidegger’s insight into the nature of this authentic self.  
For Heidegger, the search for authenticity entails a feeling of anxiety. Stein 
translates this feeling as anguish (Stein, 2007) while Dreyfus as angst (Dreyfus, 1991). 
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Projecting ourselves into the future leads us to the most insurmountable possibility, death. 
Death as we must own up to it reveals authentic being for the individual within their 
existential understanding. In positing a beginning and end to our conscious experience, 
we experience anxiety in our personal search for authenticity. The mood of anxiety has a 
capacity to disclose the way we care about our existence:  
In this anxiety…what is on display is precisely that “mattering” matters; i.e., it is 
how we care about the world that lets things be signiﬁcant. Anxiety, in other 
words, discloses “care” as the fundamental meaning of our reality…the way in 
which my reality and the reality of my world are interwoven. Authenticity is the 
distinctive stance in which I own up to this, my role as “caregiver,” so to speak, of 
my world: it is uniquely up to me to take my world up in a meaningful way 
(Russon, 2008, pg. 99). 
Russon frames what this striving is like through Heidegger’s idea of a resolution 
(Heidegger, 1927/1962, pg. 267-268). The most salient examples of resolutions come 
from experiences where we make a promise either to ourselves or others. As Russon 
states, on New Year’s Day, I say that I will try to exercise more, or quit smoking. At the 
altar of our wedding day, I say, “I will always love you” (2008). In each case, a person is 
speaking on behalf of a possible self that exists in the future. The predicament of this 
situation is that we do not know whether the person who we are speaking for will still 
abide by this promise and attempt to realize it (Russon, 2008). 
In this way, resolutions operate on the basis of a kind of fraud or lie – I claim to 
be sure that I will continue to fulfill this self-made promise, yet I cannot be entirely sure 
based on the evidence I have now (Russon, 2008). A resolution is “a promise one has 
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insufficient authority to make” (Russon, 2008, pg. 99). One speaks on behalf of someone 
one is not (Russon, 2008). When we make arrangements with our self, we must first posit 
that our future self will be much like the self we encounter here and now. In maintaining 
resoluteness, we may experience ourselves as the imposter of an imagined self. 
Heidegger’s claim, however, is that maintaining authenticity in the face of future 
possibilities (including death) requires this kind of resoluteness - it is “anticipatory 
resoluteness” (Heidegger, 1927/1962, pg. 305):  
Normally, we treat things in the world as imposing their meanings upon us: this is 
important because it is a job or because it is cold or because it is what my family 
wants or because it is a law…Anxiety is the initial discovery that the meaningful 
weight of things is not inherent to them but can be stripped away, and authenticity 
is owning up to one’s own reality as the founding meaning-giving power here.  In 
authenticity, then, one can no longer “go along with” the simple “way things are” 
but recognizes oneself as the one who must set the terms of care (Russon, 2008, 
pg. 99-100). 
Heidegger marks a major turn from Husserl’s examination of the transcendental 
subject to our most immediate way of being in the world. Heidegger’s phenomenological 
method elucidates the ontological structure of conscious existence rather than the 
essences of conscious phenomena. For Heidegger, existence precedes essence, as human 
beings are themselves ontological in that they question the possibilities of their being. But 
like Husserl, Heidegger suspends the natural attitude in order to be brought back to its 
underlying reality. By suspending the natural attitude, we can destructure the mechanistic 
meaning of experience, and return to the meaning-giving power of the authentic self. 
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In examining existence in the everyday way, experience appears to fall into the 
meanings of other objective modes of being. In being already in the world, involved in 
projects and others, the human being may realize it does not own up to the most extreme 
possibilities of its existence in simply going along with tradition. The basic everyday 
worldliness feels inauthentic, not in tune with one’s fully realized self. But surely, the 
everyday way of being can become authentic. 
Time ultimately serves as the basis for interpreting one’s conscious existence. 
Dasein’s self-differentiated character as a being that questions its being is brought out by 
the mineness of death. Indeed, the human being is intimately bound up with awareness of 
its finitude.  Consciousness marked from beginning to end constitutes the world in a way 
disconnected from the everyday self. In wondering about existence, the human being 
seeks to actualize its authentic way of being.   
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Chapter 5: Conclusion/Future Directions 
The development of scientific psychology has cast doubt on introspective 
methods for investigating the mind. As a result, the phenomenological perspective has 
been divided from scientific psychological methods. But as individuals capable of 
interpreting their own experience, phenomenology provides an understanding of our self-
reflexive capacity. The existential structure of consciousness exists for each person in 
time, each with a unique history represented by the subject. The meaning we give to our 
own experience is presented through the phenomenal concept of consciousness as a 
whole in time.  
The Hard Problem asks why consciousness as a phenomenon emerges from a 
system of complex causal mechanisms. The emergent quality of consciousness can be 
explained by the functional and social evolution of the mind, and analogized with 
computational-representational systems. Yet we still ask why we are here, having this 
experience, as the product of complex biochemical reactions. Why is there, and what is 
this feeling of consciousness, a what-it-is-like to be thinking matter?  
We do not have to accept phenomenal realism to be pluralists about how we 
should understand consciousness. Nor do we have to deplore scientific psychology. In 
fact, mechanistic knowledge has positively informed this discussion. But we do have to 
acknowledge that mechanistic explanations do not provide a complete understanding of 
consciousness, in particular, our sense of time.  
If we are able to suspend our judgement about consciousness as an emergent 
phenomenon, bracketing the scientific understanding, we see that mind actively 
experiences and understands this quality extended in time. So natural an occurrence in 
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everyday existence, we pay little attention to the constituting nature of time in 
experience. However, our implicit awareness of its beginning and end can be brought out 
in returning to the unfolding experience itself.  
What-it-is-like is elucidated through the self-reflexive consciousness that occurs 
in time, referring to the first-personal character of its own occurrence– what it is like in 
time. Heidegger’s phenomenology exposes the existential ontology of this 
consciousness– we question our finite existence and its relation to the existence of things 
in general.  
Consciousness unfolding from beginning to end exposes how time constitutes our 
experience. The concepts used to describe the temporal unity of consciousness are 
constructed in dialogue with the surrounding historical world. To put it in Daniel 
Dennett’s terminology, we are imagined and talked about to ourselves as the center of 
narrative gravity (Dennett, 1992). 
Owning up or taking hold of this meaning-giving power requires one to examine 
the whole of individual experience. Self-projection into the future that meaningfully 
connects the personal past demonstrates this whole. As Heidegger says, the human being 
is always acting as though it were ahead of itself, though properly understood within a 
limited timeline. Consciousness and the self can be easily estranged because it is our 
default attitude to understand according to the historical tradition of a particular time. 
Meaning becomes estranged in the historical tradition in which a human being 
consciously understands itself. 
The psychological tradition that extends from Darwin presupposes the influence 
of time in cognition by understanding our being through the functional development of 
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evolutionary mechanisms. Mind as a mechanistic system is reducible to the brain or an 
environmental/behavioural input-output structure. The accounts we are given in 
psychology presuppose the grounding of time for our experience as a whole.  
But as a phenomenal structure of experience temporal existence is being-towards-
death. Rather than deferring the meaning-giving power of consciousness to the ongoing 
tradition, we experience anxiety - compelling us to question the meaning of being in the 
first place. Only once the historical tradition of the time has been destructured “precisely 
in reference to the ways and means by which it specifies self-realizing experience” can 
the phenomena of existence be brought into view (Martin Heidegger, as cited in Krell, 
2008, pg. 21).  
While we have here examined Heidegger’s account of the human being and the 
self-interpretation of experience, there are many other phenomenological approaches that 
should be considered as well. This is only one extension of Husserl’s original 
phenomenological method.  
We started with the history of the mind-body problem, and said much about how 
mind and body have been conceptualized across history, but have not examined 
specifically the role of the body in our experience. The embodied and embedded nature 
of the mind in everyday experience bears a functional relationship, but how we imagine 
the self and the world of possibilities for acting bears greatly on the limits of the body. 
Juxtaposed to Heidegger, Maurice Merleau-Ponty is the best representative of a 
phenomenological inquiry into the body (1978). 
A historical inquiry into Heidegger’s existential turn may also provide an avenue 
for the cross-influence of phenomenology, psychology, and existentialism. Situating 
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Heidegger between the early existentialism of Kierkegaard and Nietzsche, and later 
development by Sartre and Camus, would shed further light on his ontological structure, 
and its later interpretations and critiques.  
In psychology, we may slowly begin to see the significance of phenomenology 
and existentialism in the concept of human agency. The phenomenology of agency and 
free will has been criticized by scientific psychology (Libet, Gleason, Wright, and Pearl, 
1983; Libet, 1985; 2004; Wegner, 2002; 2005). Indeed, the feeling of agency or what it is 
like to intentionally act in the world may be reducible to implicit motor procedures rather 
than a feeling of action produced by low-level comparator mechanisms (Grünbaum, 
2015).  
However, Heidegger’s idea of projection into the future implicates forms of 
empirically verified conscious mental representations. For example, semantic and 
episodic representations are considered two basic kinds of explicit memory storage 
(Tulving, 1985; 2002; Squire & Zola-Morgan, 1991). Tulving refers to the self-
representing quality of episodic representation as autonoetic, similar to Husserl’s term for 
the act of consciousness, noema (2002). The act of thinking about the future with 
semantic and episodic representations has been termed mental time travel (Suddendorf & 
Corballis, 2008). Imagining the self in the past and future through the storage and 
retrieval of prospective intentions would involve a combination of psychological and 
phenomenological perspectives on consciousness.  
The extent that identity development across the lifespan takes on an 
intersubjective quality for the subject (rather than a purely monological narrative as 
Dennett’s terminology might suggest) may be reflected in memories of significant others 
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and feelings of pride or shame. More specifically, self-attributed meanings are most 
proximally derived from important social relationships – even long after the death of 
these significant others (Taylor, 1991). Our identities are always defined “in dialogue 
with, sometimes in struggle against, the identities our significant others want to recognize 
in us” (Taylor, 1991, pg. 33). The value of social recognition may be implicated in what 
it is like to experience these episodes emotionally and how these experiences are 
articulated across an individual’s life. As Tomasello accounts for the evolutionary 
significance of gesture in the development of language and culture, Charles Taylor 
accounts for language in all modes of communication, including gesture, art, and love, in 
which we not only express, but define ourselves (Taylor, 1991).  
Finally, we must remember that the idea of an authentic self, uncovered through 
the existential-phenomenological reduction, is only one particular interpretation that a 
human being can take about its conscious existence. Charles Taylor speaks of the ethic of 
authenticity as a way of being that came about after the 1960’s (Taylor, 1991). Indeed, 
when Sartre, Camus, and Heidegger were gaining prominence. As such, it would be 
crucial to consider the concept of authentic existence within the developmental context of 
evolutionary psychology and Taylor’s writings on self and modernity (Taylor, 2003; 
2007).  
With these future directions in mind, and the dynamic relationship between 
consciousness, history, and our self-interpretive capacity shown, we may continue to 
destructure static understandings of the human being, thereby increasing the scope of 
study of human consciousness.    
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